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Abstract
We study abstract logics that are not necessarily closed under negation. A typical
example is the logic of all PC-classes of first-order logic. We show that Lindström’s
Theorem can be formulated as a separation theorem is abstract model theory with-
out negation. This leads us to study the connections between maximality, model-
theoretic characterization and interpolation in the absence of negation. As a case
study we investigate closely the family of extensions of first-order logic by unary
monotone quantifiers but without negation.
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ABSTRACT MODEL THEORY WITHOUT NEGATION 1
1. Introduction
There are two different ways of thinking of logics without negation. Firstly, as an
extension of a logic with negation, like the logic of PC classes, that extends Lωω,
which has negation. And secondly, as a fragment of a logic with negation, as the
positive part of Lωω is a fragment of Lωω. This means that logics without negation
can be approximated by logics with negation from inside and from outside. Hence,
the extension of the study of classical logics by the study of logics without negation
is twofold. In this thesis we explore how several concepts and results in abstract
model theory translate when we drop negation out. These model theoretic results
for logics without negation are in a way extensions of such results with negation.
There exist many examples that justify a general study of logics without nega-
tion. In mathematical logic those are related to restricted quantifier fragments of,
for instance, Lωω,Lω∞ or L2ωω, such as the logic of existential sentences; existential
universal FI logic, [PV05]; transfinite game formulas, [Hy90]; existential second or-
der IF logic, [Hi96]; or the logic of positive bounded formulas for Banach structures,
[Io1]. There are more varied examples in philosophical logic or logics formalizing
phenomena in natural language.
Throughout the effort of outlining a first detailed prospect of the model theory
of an abstract logic without negation, we explain the main obstacles, troubles and
lacks we had to do with in order to deal with the logic. In the beginning of the
study of extensions of first-order logic, the interest in developing such extensions
was grounded on the need of studying various mathematical concepts, not definable
in first-order logic, that appear especially in some new fields in mathematics -such
as being a countable, a well ordered, or a measurable set. But while these extensions
have a richer expressive power, it turned out that they lacked interesting proper-
ties present in first-order logic. In 1969, Lindström [L69] proved a very important
maximality theorem: ‘First-order logic is a maximal logic satisfying Compactness
and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems’. That is, any logic expressing more things than
first-order logic, will loose at least one of those two model theoretic properties. This
phenomenon is interesting by itself; it makes the study of model theoretic languages
depart from its original aim, and gives rise to abstract model theory, a new field in
model theory that will study these languages concentrating on its model theoretic
properties. In this field we are not interested anymore in designing a particular lan-
guage being able to describe a model as having this or that property. Instead, we
are interested in constructing logics with interesting properties, such as satisfying
compactness, Löwenheim-Skolem property, Craig’s Interpolation Theorem, etc. We
are happier if we find a logic to be maximal with respect to these properties. We are
even satisfied with just proving the existence of such logics, without ever glancing
at how they look like.
We study maximality theorems in logics without negation in the context of their
relation to interpolation theorems. A close examination of the ingredients of Lind-
ström’s Theorem reveals that when the proof is broken into its parts, a proof of
Craig Interpolation Theorem emerges. The framework for this study is hinted at by
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Flum, although not fully exploited, in [Fl85]. Caicedo [Ca79], [Ca81], [Ca83] pre-
sented several results for extensions of first-order logic with generalized quantifiers
that fit within this framework. As he reckons, under very weak assumptions any
such extension can be expressed in the form Lωω(Q) (where Lωω denotes first-order
logic), for Q = {Qi : i ∈ I} any set of quantifiers. This is also the case for all logics
with interpolation. All these logics can be provided with a back-and-forth system
[Ca80], so we can find a back-and-forth system for any logic worth to explore1. Like-
wise, all proofs in the above papers concerning interpolation made heavy use of this
feature. We therefore use back-and-forth systems as the frame for our investigation
in interpolation.
The conclusions of the study of the relation between interpolation and maximal-
ity are, in the first place, that for this relation to exist, one should, as suggested
by Barwise and van Benthem in [BvB99], understand interpolation theorem for a
logic L with some invariance R as: “If K1,K2 are disjoint classes belonging to (re-
lated by R in a way made explicit later) PC(L), then they can be separated by an
elementary L-class.” -one recovers the usual interpolation when one considers all
PC(L)-classes2. In the second place, that the proof of interpolation by back-and-
forth arguments is only possible when the logic is maximal with respect to some
model theoretic properties, and when the invariance under R is among these charac-
terizing properties. These conclusions break down in the case the logic is not closed
under negation. Basically what happens is that maximality and interpolation theo-
rems can be stated as corollaries for a so called separation theorem, and the proofs
of these corollaries have different sensibilities to the lack of negation.
1.1. Structure of the thesis. In Section 3 we present the study of Lindström’s
theorem for logics without negation, for fragments as well as for extensions of Lωω.
Section 4 is a presentation of the relation between interpolation and maximality
theorems in a general framework with and without negation.
Since Section 4 links the proof of interpolation to maximality, in Section 5 we
analyze what individual model theoretic properties give rise to orderings of logics
with maximal points. We also investigate how this maximality translates in the case
we do not have negation. No proof of maximality for individual properties, with or
without negation, uses back-and-forth methods, and although all these logics have
1Although it is true that any extension of first-order logic can be written in the form Lωω(Q),
these extensions are generally divided into two essential kinds: Infinitary logics, Lκλ with con-
junctions or disjunctions of length < κ, and strings of existential or universal quantifiers of size
less than λ; and extensions by generalized quantifiers, presented for the first time by Mostowski
[Mo57], and Lindström [L66]. Infinitary logics have back-and-forth systems [D75] which are de-
scribed independently of their representation as Lωω(Q).
2The main reason to do that is that the PC-operation does not preserve the Karp property
(partial isomorphism would be a concrete case of the R mentioned above). We want to consider
interpolation as a property that emerges from the preservation under PC of certain properties,
including invariance under R. When the logic itself is invariant under R, we get a proof of
maximality. When the logic has a property that makes R be the relation of isomorphism, we get
a proof of full interpolation.
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a weaker form of interpolation, proving whether they have interpolation is a very
difficult matter: we seem to find ourselves without tools to determine it.
In Section 6, we study extensions of first order logic with upward monotone
quantifiers without negation. Flum [Fl85] gave a model theoretic characterization
of cardinal quantifiers Qα in terms of monotonicity and Löwenheim-Skolem theo-
rems. In our framework, a cardinal quantifier splits into four: Q+α , Q−α , Q˜+α , and
Q˜−α , whose interpretations are A |= Q+αxφ(x) iff |{a ∈ A : A |= φ(a¯, a)}| ≥ ℵα,
A |= Q−αxφ(x) iff |{a ∈ A : A 6|= φ(a¯, a)}| < ℵα, A |= Q˜+αxφ(x) iff |{a ∈ A : A |=
φ(a¯, a)}| < ℵα, and A |= Q˜−αxφ(x) iff |{a ∈ A : A 6|= φ(a¯, a)}| ≥ ℵα. Only the
two first quantifiers are upward monotone. It is proved that L = Lωω(Qi)i=0,1,...,n
without negation, where Qi are upwards monotone quantifiers, is equivalent to
Lωω(Q+αj , Q−βk) j=0,...,mk=m+1,...,n for some αj and βk, and the question arises for what com-
binations of αj and βk does the logic satisfy interpolation and compactness.
It is proved that Lωω(Q+α , Q−β ) is compact if α < β, or if β ≤ α and: 1.) ℵγ =
ℵℵ0γ , β = γ + 1, or 2.) ℵ0 is small for ℵβ, β a limit ordinal. However, separation
holds if β > α, and interpolation fails if α ≥ β. The results on interpolation can be
regarded as an extension of the results of Caicedo [Ca83], and those on compactness
an extension of the result of Shelah [Sh71].
2. Preliminaries
We start by defining the basic concepts and conventions, based on the framework
presented at [E85].
Definition 1. A vocabulary τ is a nonempty set that consists of finitary relation
symbols P,R, . . . , and constant symbols c, d, . . . . A τ -structure A is a pair 〈A, ν〉,
where A, called the domain of A, is a nonempty set and ν is a map that assigns to
every n-ary relation symbol R in τ , an n-ary relation on An, and to every constant
symbol in τ an element in A. For any symbol T ∈ τ, TA denotes the interpretation
of T on A. We denote structures by A[τ ] = 〈A, TAi 〉Ti∈τ . Given a structure A of
vocabulary τ and a constant symbol c /∈ τ , the structure 〈A, a〉 denotes the expansion
of A to a vocabulary τ ∪ {c}, and a is the interpretation of c in A.
Definition 2. A renaming is a map ρ : τ → σ that is a bijection from a vocabulary
τ to a vocabulary σ, that maps relation symbols to relation symbols of the same arity,
and constants to constants. Given a renaming ρ and a structure A of vocabulary τ ,
B = Aρ is a structure of vocabulary σ with B = A and ρ(T )B = TA, for all symbols
T ∈ τ .
Let Str[τ ] denote the class of structures of vocabulary τ . Let σ ⊆ τ , and let
A ∈ Str[τ ]. We define A  σ, the reduct of A, to be the structure B = 〈A, TA〉T∈σ,
where TA = TB for T ∈ σ.
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Definition 3. A logic is a pair 〈L, |=L〉 where L is a map defined on vocabularies
such that L[τ ] is a class called the class of L-sentences of vocabulary τ , and |=L
(the L-satisfaction relation) is a relation between structures and L-formulas such
that the following conditions (called closure properties) hold:
(1) Inclusion property. If σ ⊆ τ , then L[σ] ⊆ L[τ ].
(2) Isomorphism property. If A |=L ϕ, and A ∼= B, then B |=L ϕ.
(3) Reduct Property. If ϕ ∈ L[τ ] and τ ⊆ τA, then A |=L ϕ iff A  τ |=L ϕ.
(4) Renaming Property. If ρ : σ → τ is a renaming, then for each ϕ ∈ L[σ]
there is a ψρ ∈ L[τ ] such that for all σ-structures A, A |=L ϕ iff Aρ |=L ϕρ;
(5) Substitution Property. Suppose σ ⊆ τ , and ϕ ∈ L[τ ], and for all Ri ∈ τ\σ,
we have a sentence ϕi(di1, . . . , diki) ∈ L[σ ∪ {di1, . . . , diki}], ki the arity of Ri,
and di1, . . . , diki new constants. For any structure A ∈ Str[σ], let A∗ ∈ Str[τ ]
be such that A∗  σ = A, and for all Ri ∈ τ\σ,RA∗i = {〈a1, . . . , aki〉 :
(A, a1, . . . , aki) |=L ϕi(di1, . . . , diki)}. Then there is ϕ∗ ∈ L[σ] such that for
all A ∈ Str[σ],A |=L ψ ↔ A∗ |=L ϕ. We say that ψ is obtained from ϕ by
simultaneously replacing each Ri ∈ τ\σ by ϕi(di1, di2, . . . , diki)3;
(6) Atom Property. For all τ and atomic ϕ ∈ Lωω[τ ] there is a sentence ψ ∈ L[τ ]
such that ModτL(ψ) =ModτLωω(ϕ);
(7) Conjunction Property. For all τ and all ϕ, ψ,∈ L[τ ] there is θ ∈ L[τ ] such
that ModτL(ϕ) ∩ModτL(ψ) =ModτL(θ);
(8) Disjunction Property. For all τ and all ϕ, ψ,∈ L[τ ] there is θ ∈ L[τ ] such
that ModτL(ϕ) ∪ModτL(ψ) =ModτL(θ);
(9) Particularization Property. If c ∈ τ , then for any ϕ ∈ L[τ ] there is ψ ∈
L[τ\{c}] such that for all [τ\{c}]-structures A,A |=L ψ iff 〈A, a〉 |=L ϕ for
some a ∈ A. In a context of a logic with free variables we write ψ as ∃xϕ(x);
(10) Universalization. If c ∈ τ , then for any ϕ ∈ L[τ ] there is a sentence ψ ∈
L[τ\{c}] such that for all [τ\{c}]-structures A,A |=L ψ iff 〈A, a〉 |=L ϕ for
all a ∈ A. In a context of a logic with free variables we write ψ as ∀xϕ(x).
Further closure properties that a logic may have in the course of this thesis are
listed below. Contrary to what happens with the above properties, we don’t assume
a logic to be closed under these properties, so in the cases where they are present,
these closures will be always mentioned explicitly.
3It should be mentioned that in a context without negation, we only can make substitutions of
P in formulas θ(P ) where all occurrences of P are positive, or in terms of classes, where the class
in which we make the substitution is persistent upwards with respect to P , i.e. if 〈A, P, . . . 〉 ∈ K
and P ⊆ P ′, then 〈A, P ′, . . . 〉 ∈ K. The role of substitution in abstract logic without negation
seems to deserve more study.
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Definition 4 (Generalized quantifier). Let σ be a finite vocabulary. Let K be a class
of σ-structures closed under isomorphism. Suppose for simplicity that σ = {R, c}
with R binary and c a constant. Let Q be a new quantifier symbol. The logic L(QK)
is obtained as follows:
L(QK)[τ ] is taken as the smallest set (or class) containing L[τ ] which is closed
under properties of definition 3, and which with each φ, ξ and for any variables
x0, x1, y, also contains the formula:
θ = Qx0x1yφξ.
The meaning of Q is determined by the satisfaction relation:
A |=L(QK) Qx0x1yφ(x0, x1)ξ(y)
iff there is a σ -structure C ∈ K such that C = A
RC = {(a, b) ∈ C × C : A |=L(QK) φ[a, b]}
and A |=L(QK) ξ[a] iff a = cC.
We usually identify a quantifier QK with the class of models K. A quantifier Q
may be defined on a set A by a set of subsets of A. So, given a class K, QK(A) =
{X ⊆ A : (A,X) ∈ K}. The dual of Q, in symbols Qd is defined as Qd = {X ⊆ A :
X /∈ Q(A).
Example 5. The following list associates a quantifier Q with the corresponding
class of models K:
• ∃ for K = {(A,C) : ∅ 6= C ⊆ A};
• ∀ for K = {(A,C) : A = C};
• The Magidor-Malitz quantifier Qnα forK = {(A,D) : D ⊆ An, and there is C ⊆
A, |C| ≥ ℵα and Cn ⊆ D};
• The cofinality quantifier Qcfω forK = {(A,<A) :<A is a linear ordering on A
of cofinality ω}
Definition 6 (Further closure properties).
(11) Negation Property. For all τ and all ϕ ∈ L[τ ] there is a sentence ψ ∈ L[τ ]
such that ModτL(ϕ) = Str[τ ] \ModτL(ψ);
(12) Relativization Property. If c /∈ τ ∪σ, ξ ∈ L[τ ∪c] and ϕ ∈ L[τ ], then there is
a sentence ψ ∈ L[τ ∪ c] such that for any (τ ∪ σ)-structure B, if ξB denotes
the set {b ∈ B : (B, b) |= ξ}, then B |= ψ iff (B  τ)|ξB |= ϕ. Set X = ξB,
then ψ := [φ]X is the relativization of φ to X.
(13) PC∆-operation. If S = {ϕn : n ∈ ω} is a set of L[τ ]-sentences, and if σ ⊆ τ ,
then there is a sentence ψ ∈ L[σ] such that
ModσL(ψ) = (
⋂
n
ModτL(ϕn))  σ.
If S contains just one sentence, the operation is called PC.
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(14) Q-Projection. Let K be a class of models of vocabulary σ = {S1, . . . , Sm}
disjoint from τ . Then for any ϕi ∈ L[τ∪{c0, c1, . . . , cki−1}] there is ψi ∈ L[τ ]
such that A ∈ModτL(ψi) iff
• There is a structure C ∈ K with C = A, and
• For all ki and all ki-ary Si ∈ σ, SCi = {(a0, . . . , aki−1) ∈ Cn : 〈A, a0, a1, . . . ,
aki−1〉 |= ϕi}.
In a context of a logic with free variables we write ψ as
QKx
1
0, . . . , x
1
k1−1, . . . , x
m
0 , . . . , x
m
km−1ϕ1(x
1
0, . . . , x
1
k1−1) . . . ϕm(x
m
0 , . . . , x
m
km−1).
If a logic satisfies condition 12, it is called regular. Any regular logic contains
Lωω. If a logic satisfies condition 13, it is called relativizing. We identify sentences
with classes of models, and express abstract sentences by means of a generalized
quantifier. So, given a logic L and a class of models K of an abstract sentence
corresponding to a generalized quantifier QK, the extension L(QK) of L by QK is
the logic we get when we add QK to L and close under Q-projection.
For ϕ an L-sentence, and a structure A, A |=L ϕ is read “A is a model of ϕ”. By
ModτL(ϕ) we denote the class of τ -structures A such that A |=L φ}. If K is a class
of models of vocabulary τ , then K  σ = {A  σ : A ∈ K}, and K = Str[τ ] \K.
Definition 7. Let τ, τ ′ be two countable vocabularies, L a logic, and K a class of
τ -structures.
(1) K is an L-elementary class, in symbols K ∈ EC(L), or K is EC in L, if
there is a sentence θ ∈ L[τ ] such that K =Modτ (θ).
(2) K is an L-elementary class in the wider sense, in symbols K ∈ EC∆(L),
or K is EC∆ in L if there is a set of sentences Θ ⊂ L[τ ] such that K =
Modτ (θ).
(3) K is an L-pseudo elementary class, in symbols K ∈ PC(L), or K is PC
over L if there is a vocabulary τ ′ ⊇ τ and a sentence θ ∈ L[τ ′] such that
K =Modτ ′(θ)  τ .
(4) K is an L-co-pseudo elementary class, in symbols K ∈ cPC(L), or K is
cPC over L if K is the complement of a PC(L)-class.
(5) K is an L-pseudo elementary class in the wider sense, in symbols K ∈
PC∆(L), or K is PC∆ over L if there is a vocabulary τ ′ ⊇ τ and a set of
sentences Θ ⊂ L[τ ′] such that K =Modτ ′(Θ)  τ .
Definition 8. Let L,L∗ be logics. We say that L∗ (properly) extends L, in symbols
L ≤ L∗ (L < L∗), if every EC-class in L[τ ], is an EC-class in L∗[τ ] (and moreover
there is an EC-class K in L∗[τ ], such that K is not an EC-class in L[τ ]).
Definition 9. Let Q be a quantifier. The quantifier rank of a formula ϕ, in symbols
qr(ϕ) is defined inductively as follows:
a) qr(ϕ) = 0, if ϕ is atomic;
b) qr(¬ϕ) = qr(ϕ);
c) qr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = max{qr(ϕ), qr(ψ)};
d) qr(Qxϕ) = qr(ϕ) + 1.
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Definition 10. A partial isomorphism between two models A,B is a function p
from X ⊆ A to Y ⊆ B such that the following holds;
(1) For all n ≥ 1, n-ary R ∈ τ and a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ X : RA(~a) iff RB(p(~a));
(2) For all c ∈ τ and a ∈ X : cA = a iff cB = p(a).
Part(A,B) denotes the set of partial isomorphisms between A and B.
Definition 11. A back-and-forth system for (A,B) is a decreasing sequence I =
(Iβ)β≤α of subsets of Part(A,B) that satisfies the following conditions:
(i) Each Ii is a set of partial isomorphisms.
(ii) ∅ ∈ Iα
(iii) For β < α, if p ∈ Iβ+1 and a ∈ A, then there is b ∈ B such that p∪{〈a, b〉} ∈
Iβ.
(iv) For β < α, if p ∈ Iβ+1 and b ∈ B, then there is a ∈ A such that p∪{〈a, b〉} ∈
Iβ.
Suppose F is a function which maps structures A and B of the same vocabulary
to a set F (A,B) ⊆ Part(A,B). Then we call the functions in F (A,B) simply
partial F -isomorphisms. An F -back-and-forth system is a back-and-forth system of
partial F -isomorphisms. All notation for partial isomorphisms would be obtained
just by ignoring F in the following definitions.
Definition 12. Let L be a logic. Given two structures A, B:
a) A and B are α-F -isomorphic via I, written I : A ∼=Fα B, iff I = (Iβ)β≤α is
an F -back-and-forth system.
b) A and B are α-F -isomorphic, written A ∼=Fα iff there is I such that I :
A ∼=Fα B.
c) I ⊆ F (A,B) has the back (forth) property if for each p ∈ I and b ∈ B(a ∈ A)
there is q ∈ I, p ⊆ q with b ∈ rg(q)(a ∈ dom(p)).
d) A and B are partially F -isomorphic A ∼=Fp B if in there is I ⊆ F (A,B)
with the back-and-forth property.
e) We write A ≤L B, if every sentence in L satisfied in A is also satisfied in
B. We write A ≤nL B if every sentence of quantifier rank at most n in L
satisfied in A is also satisfied in B. If A ≤L B and B ≤L A, then we write
A ≡L B and say that A and B are L-equivalent. If L is Lωω we say the
above models are elementary equivalent.
Lemma 13. Let F (A,B) be closed under ω-chains. Any two countable F -partially
isomorphic models are F -isomorphic.
Proof. Let A = {an : n ∈ ω}, B = {bn : n ∈ ω}, and let I ⊆ F (A,B) have the back-
and-forth property. Suppose we have defined, for n ≤ k, c2n = an, and d2n+1 = bn,
and a sequence In = 〈q0, q1, . . . , qn−1〉 ⊆ I such that qi(ci) = di. We denote such
sequence by 〈cn〉In〈dn〉. If k = 2r, set ck = ar. By the forth condition, there is a
least index s such that 〈c0, . . . , ck〉In+1〈d0, . . . , dk−1, bs〉. Set dk = bs. Similarly if k
is odd. As all functions in I are partial F -isomorphisms, g = {〈cn, dn〉 : n ∈ ω} is
an F -isomorphism from A onto B. 
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Definition 14 (Model Theoretic Properties).
(1) Compactness: L is (countably) compact iff for all (countable) Φ ⊆ L[τ ], if
each finite subset of Φ has a model, then Φ has a model. Weaker forms of
compactness are:
• Small well ordering number, where the well ordering number of L is
defined as the supremum of all ordinals α such that for some L-sentence
φ(<, . . . ) having only models with well ordered <, there is a model of
φ that is a well-ordering of type α.
• Boundedness: L is bounded if for any L-sentence φ(<, . . . ) having only
models with well ordered <, there is an ordinal α such that the order
type of < is always less than α.
Without negation, in addition to the previously defined notion of compactness
we have:
(a) Dual compactness: L is dual compact (DC) if given a countable set of
sentences Φ of vocabulary τ such that
⋃
Φ = Str[τ ], there is a finite
subset Φ0 ⊆ Φ such that
⋃
Φ0 = Str[τ ].
(b) ?- compactness: L is ?-compact if given two sets of sentences Φ, and
Φ′, if for every finite Φ0 ⊆ Φ and every finite Φ′0 ⊆ Φ′ there is a model
which satisfies each sentence in Φ0 and no sentence in Φ′0, then there is
a model which satisfies each sentence in Φ, and no sentence in Φ′.
(2) L satisfies the Downward Löwenhein-Skolem Property down to κ (LS(κ))
iff each satisfiable sentence has a model of size ≤ κ. When κ = ω we just
write LS. Weaker forms of the Löwenhein-Skolem property are:
• Small l(L), where the Löwenheim number l(L) of L is the least cardinal
µ such that any satisfiable sentence has a model of power ≤ µ. Any
logic L with a set of sentences has l(L) = λ for some cardinal λ. Such
logics are called small or set logics. Otherwise, l(L) = ∞, and L is
called a big or class logic.
• Small lΣ(L), the Löwenheim number lΣ(L) for countable sets of sen-
tences of L is the least cardinal µ such that any countable satisfiable set
of sentences has a model of power ≤ µ.
Without negation, in addition to the previously defined notion of LS we have:
(a) L satisfies the Dual Löwenheim-Skolem Property (DuLS) if any sen-
tence that is true in all countable models, is true in all models.
(b) L has ?-LS if every sentence is determined by its countable models,
i.e. if given two classes EC-classes K1,K2, n(K1) = n(K2) implies
K1 = K2, where n(K) denotes the class of countable models in K.
(3) L has the Karp property if any two partially isomorphic structures are L-
equivalent. Karp property can be generalized to partial F -isomorphisms.
(4) L satisfies the Separation Theorem if any two disjoint PC-classes in L can
be separated by an EC-class in L. A weaker form of Separation theorem is:
• L satisfies the ∆- interpolation theorem if for each class of models K ∈
L, if K and K are PC in L, then they are EC in L.
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Without negation, in addition to the previously defined notion of the Sepa-
ration Theorem we have:
(a) Reduction theorem. If K1 and K2 are two cPC(L)-classes such that
K1∪K2 = Str[τ ], then there are K′1 and K′2 in L such that K′1∩K′2 = ∅,
K′1 ∪K′2 = Str[τ ], and K′i ⊆ Ki, i = 1, 2.
(b) Craig Interpolation Theorem. Given ϕ, ψ ∈ L, such that ϕ |= ψ, there
is θ ∈ L such that τ(θ) ⊆ τ(ϕ) ∩ τ(ψ) and ϕ |= θ and θ |= ψ.
The choices of (a) and (b) in both (1) and (2) above are not arbitrary. Dual
compactness is the definition of compactness used in topology. Dual Löwenheim-
Skolem is an alternative and intuitive way of thinking about this property, and in
fact it is the formulation used originally by Löwenheim in his pioneering paper from
1915, [Lö15]4. The motivation of using ?-LS comes from the proof of Wacławek in
[W78] about the existence of maximal logics with that property.
We notice that there are two basically different kinds of model theoretic prop-
erties. On one hand, we have the properties such that if they are not present in
a logic, then no extension of this logic enjoy these properties. That is the case of
compactness, Karp, and Löwenheim-Skolem properties. On the other hand, there
are properties that can be in principle recovered in an extension of any logic lacking
them. This is the case of interpolation. We do not know of any operation on a
logic L with negation and without interpolation that will give an extension with
negation and interpolation -without negation there is the trivial one, which consists
in adding all PC(L) classes. However, there is a natural closure on ∆-interpolation,
introduced by H. Friedman [F71] and J. Barwise [B72], and first referred to in a
published paper by J. Barwise [B74].
Definition 15 (The ∆-closure). Given a logic L, ∆(L) is the logic that has as
EC-classes just the PC(L)-classes whose complement is also PC(L).
The∆-extension of a logic is deeply studied by J. A. Makowsky et al. in [MShS76].
They prove it is automatically closed under conjunction and Q-projection. It is
also closed under negation provided L is. They also proved that the ∆-extension
preserves many model theoretic properties.
3. Lindström’s theorem without negation
The first result of this section, Theorem 19, is not on its own a Lindström’s
theorem but rather an illustration of the relation between this theorem and Craig’s
Interpolation Theorem. In a context without negation, both theorems share the
same form, in the sense that both are covered by the same theorem: the Separation
Theorem. This theorem yields Lindström’s Theorem when we add negation into the
picture, but while the Separation Theorem implies, with or without negation, the
4I thank this piece of knowledge to Dr. Juliette Kennedy.
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Interpolation Theorem, it does not necessarily imply a characterization theorem if
we do not have negation.
3.1. Lindström’s theorem for a fragment of Lωω.
We present a generalized form of Lindström’s Theorem for the fragment of first-
order sentences in which a particular predicate occurs only positively. It has as
corollary a weaker form of Lyndon’s Interpolation theorem.
L[τ ],L∗[τ ], . . . will be used to denote arbitrary logics. However, when the logic or
the vocabulary are clear from the context, we use τ -formula, or L∗-formula respec-
tively, instead of the longer notation L[τ ]-formula. If P is a predicate symbol in τ ,
Lωω[τ, P+] denotes the set of sentences in Lωω[τ ] in which P occurs only positively.
Lrωω[τ, P+] is the set of formulas in Lωω[τ ] with free variables among x1, . . . , xr in
which P occurs only positively. We call formulas in Lrωω[τ, P+] P -positive. Next
definition introduces a relation that is an isomorphism with respect to every symbol
in the language except for a particular predicate P .
Definition 16. Let A,B be τ -structures. A bijection pi : A→ B is a P -isomorphism
A→ B if for all r-tuples a¯ ∈ A
A |= P (a¯)⇒ B |= P (pi(a¯))
and
A |= Ri(a¯) iff B |= Ri(pi(a¯)) for Ri ∈ τ r {P}.
A and B are P -isomorphic, written A ∼=P B if there is a P -isomorphism A→ B.
An FP -back-and-forth system is a back-and-forth system in which FP (A,B) = {p ∈
Part(A,B) : p is a partial P -isomorphism}.
This definition implies that when we are going FP -back-and-forth between two
models A,B, the image of an element b ∈ B such that B 6|= P (b) is an element a
with A 6|= P (a) (and agrees in the rest of the predicates with b). But if B |= P (b),
then one does not need to look whether A 6|= P (a) or not (we only have to take care
of the rest of the predicates).
Lemma 17. Every P -positive formula is preserved by P -isomorphisms.
Proof. Let pi be a P -isomorphism A→ B. We prove by induction on the formation
of P -positive formulas, that for all assignments s:
A |=s φ→ B |=pi◦s φ.
The case for a P -positive atomic or negated atomic formulas comes directly from
definition, and the case for connectives is easy.
Now suppose φ = ∃xψ(x), and A |=s φ. Then there is a ∈ A such that A |=s[a/x]
ψ(x). By induction hypothesis,B |=pi◦(s[a/x]) ψ(x). But pi◦(s[a/x]) = (pi◦s)[pi(a)/x],
so B |=(pi◦s)[pi(a)/x] ψ(x), and thus B |=(pi◦s) ∃xψ(x). 
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We adapt the following technical notion from [L69]. It is introduced to avoid
redundancy in the use of quantifiers or boolean connectives. This prevents formulas
from being arbitrarily long, and the number of them becoming infinite.
Definition 18. An (r, r)-condition is any atomic or negated atomic formula in
Lrωω[τ, P+]. A complete (r, i)-condition is any disjunction of conjunctions of (r, i)-
conditions. An (r, i− 1)-condition is a formula of the form ∃xjχ or ∀xjχ, where χ
is a complete (r, i)-condition, and j ∈ {1, 2,· · ·}.
We will see in Lemmas 22 and 23 below that any φ ∈ Lrωω[τ, P+] of quantifier
rank ≤ n is equivalent to some (n+ r, r)-condition. For each different variant of
back-and-forth system we have a corresponding variant of the definition of the (r, i)-
conditions. Lemma 24 (which is the central part of the proof of Theorem 19) shows
the dependency between back-and-forth systems and formulas. In particular, in the
proof of (i)→ (ii) of this lemma it is essential that the set of formulas is finite.
The following theorem is a generalization of Lindström’s Theorem with respect
to back-and-forth systems. Similar generalizations have been given by Flum [Fl85],
Barwise and van Benthem [BvB99], and more recently by Otto [M00]. In those
cases, a particular separation theorem for a logic L was obtained from the inter-
play between invariant fragments of L (which amounted to generalizations of Karp
property), or of PC(L); and (weaker forms of) compactness. In our particular case,
although through the same mechanisms as the mentioned works, we focus on the
different implications the negation-less aspect of the logic has to interpolation and
maximality.
Theorem 19. Let τ be a finite and relational vocabulary and P be a predicate symbol
in τ . Let L∗ be a logic with the Compactness and Downward Löwenheim-Skolem
properties, and closed under isomorphism. Let L∗ also be closed under ∨,∧,∃,∀
(but not necessarily under negation). Assume L∗ contains Lω,ω[τ, P+].
Let φ, ψ be τ -sentences in L∗ such that Mod(φ) ∩Mod(ψ) = ∅, and Mod(φ) is
closed under P -isomorphisms. Then there is θ ∈ Lωω[τ, P+] such that Mod(ψ) ∩
Mod(θ) = ∅, and Mod(φ) ⊆Mod(θ).
Before proving this theorem, we need some definitions and lemmas.
Contrary to what happens in the first-order case, this theorem cannot be stated
in a Lindström like form, for Lωω[τ, P+] is not the strongest logic with the com-
pactness and Löwenheim-Skolem properties that is closed under P -isomorphisms
-indeed, PC(Lωω[τ, P+]) is a compact extension of Lωω[τ, P+] with the Downward
Löwenhein-Skolem property. That means that this generalization for Lindström’s
theorem as a separation theorem is too wide and does not preserve its character of
characterization theorem. In Section 4, Theorem 47 is a generalization that pre-
serves the characterization and the separation character of Lindström’s theorem for
fragments of first-order logic. There we also discuss why there are such differences
between both generalizations, and also what are the implications of this fact to the
relation between Lindström’s theorem and Craig Interpolation theorem.
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Definition 20. A formula is said to be in negation normal form (nnf) if it is built
up from atomic formulas and their negations using ∨,∧,∃,∀.
Every first-order formula is equivalent to an nnf formula. We assume throughout
this section that first-order formulas are in nnf .
Definition 21. An assignment s is a map attributing to each variable x a value
a in the domain of every model. We write A |=s φ to denote 〈A, a¯〉 |= φ(a¯) when
s(x¯) = a¯. Given an assignment s, we write s[a/x] to denote the assignment that
attributes to x the value of a in A, and that coincides with s elsewhere.
Lemma 22. Let Φ = {φ1, . . . , φn} be a finite set of Lrωω[τ ]-formulas, and 〈Φ〉 the
least set that contains Φ and is closed under ∨,¬. Then any formula in 〈Φ〉 is log-
ically equivalent to some disjunction of conjunctions of the formulas in {φ1, . . . , φn,
¬φ1, . . . ,¬φn}. In addition, there are only finitely many pairwise logically nonequiv-
alent formulas in 〈Φ〉.
Proof. Suppose each φi has free variables among x1, . . . , xr. Given a model A,
and a tuple a¯ = (a1, . . . , ar) ∈ A, take the conjunction ξ(A,a¯)(x1, . . . , xr) of formulas
ξ(x1, . . . , xr) from {φ1, . . . , φn,¬φ1, . . . ,¬φn} such that A |= ξ(a1, . . . , ar). It is
clear that the set of satisfiable conjunctions is finite, with cardinality at most 2n.
For any ψ ∈ 〈Φ〉, take the disjunction χ(x1, . . . , xr) =
∨{ξ(A,a¯)(x1, . . . , xr) : A |=
ψ(a1, . . . , ar)}. Suppose B |= χ(b1, . . . , br). Then there is ξ(A,a¯)(x1, . . . , xr) with
(a1, . . . , ar) ∈ A such that B |= ξ(A,a¯)(b1, . . . , br) and A |= ψ(a1, . . . , ar). So, we
have A such that
A |= φi(a1, . . . , ar) ⇐⇒ B |= φi(b1, . . . , br).
Given that ψ ∈ 〈Φ〉, and A |= ψ(a1, . . . , ar), we conclude that B |= ψ(b1, . . . , br).
Now suppose B |= ψ(b1, . . . , br). Then ξB,b¯ belongs to the disjunction χ(x1, . . . , xr).
Since B |= ξB,b¯(b1, . . . , br), it follows that B |= χ(x1, . . . , xr). 
The representatives of each of the equivalence classes of Lemma 22 can be taken
to be the (r, i)-conditions.
Lemma 23. For any n ∈ N there are, up to logical equivalence, only finitely many
Lrωω[τ, P+]-formulas of quantifier rank ≤ n.
Proof. By induction on n.
n = 0: Let ψ ∈ Lrωω[τ, P+] be an atomic or negated atomic formula. Since τ is
finite and relational, the set of (r, r)-conditions is finite. The case for quantifier free
formulas follows from Lemma 22 if we take Φ to be the set of (r, r)-conditions.
Induction step: Suppose we have already proved there are formulas {φ1, . . . , φh} ∈
Lrωω[τ, P+] of quantifier rank ≤ n, and formulas {χ1, . . . , χk} ∈ Lr+1ωω [τ, P+] of quan-
tifier rank ≤ n such that every formula in Lrωω[τ, P+] (respectively in Lr+1ωω [τ, P+])
of quantifier rank ≤ n is logically equivalent to some φi (respectively χj).
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Given a formula in ψ ∈ Lrωω[τ, P+] of quantifier rank ≤ n + 1, it can be proved
by induction on ψ that it is contained in
〈Φ1〉 = 〈{φ ∈ Lrωω[τ, P+] : qr(φ) ≤ n} ∪ {∃xχ ∈ Lrωω[τ, P+] : qr(χ) ≤ n}〉
We prove:
(∗) Any such ψ is logically equivalent to a formula in
〈Φ2〉 = 〈{φ1, . . . , φh} ∪ {∃xrχ1, . . . ,∃xrχk}〉.
But then, by Lemma 22, 〈Φ2〉 contains only finitely many formulas which are
pairwise logically non-equivalent.
Proof of (∗): By induction hypothesis, every ψ ∈ Lrωω[τ, P+] of quantifier rank
≤ n is logically equivalent to some φi. Now, if ∃xχ ∈ Lrωω[τ, P+] and qr(χ) ≤ n,
then A |= ∃xχ(a1, . . . , ar, x) iff there is a ∈ A A |= χ(a1, . . . , ar, ar+1). Now, χ ∈
Lr+1ωω [τ, P+] and has quantifier rank ≤ n, hence is logically equivalent to some χj;
thus ∃xχ is equivalent to ∃xrχi. Finally, it is easy to verify that if every formula in
Φ1 is logically equivalent to a formula in Φ2, then every formula in 〈Φ1〉 is logically
equivalent to a formula in 〈Φ2〉. 
Lemma 24. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) For every r and ψ ∈ Lrωω[τ, P+] of quantifier rank ≤ n, A |= ψ ⇒ B |= ψ.
(ii) There is an FP -back-and-forth sequence P0 . . . Pn for (A,B).
Proof. We prove by induction onm < n that for (a1, . . . , ar) ∈ A, and (b1, . . . , br) ∈
B, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i’) For all ψ ∈ Lrωω[τ, P+] of quantifier rank ≤ m,A |= ψ(a1, . . . , ar) ⇒ B |=
ψ(b1, . . . , br).
(ii’) There is a P -back-and-forth sequence P0 ⊇ P1 ⊇ . . . Pm for (A,B) such that
{〈a1, b1〉, . . . , 〈ar, br〉} ∈ P0.
(i’)⇒(ii’): Clearly,m = 0 gives us a partial P -isomorphism with domain 〈a1, . . . , ar〉
and range 〈b1, . . . , br〉.
Induction step: Suppose we have proved the claim for m < n. Then we have a
sequence P0 ⊇ P1 ⊇, . . . , Pm such that {〈a1, b1〉, . . . , 〈ar+m, br+m〉} ∈ P0. Let p ∈ Pm
be such that p(ai) = bi, for i = 1, . . . , r+m. Take ξ(a1, . . . , ar+m, a) to be the (r+m+
1, r + 1)-condition such that A |= ξ(a1, . . . , ar+m, a). Then ∃xξ(a1, . . . , ar+m, x) has
quantifier rank m. By induction hypothesis, B |= ∃xξ(b1, . . . , br+m, x). Therefore
there is b ∈ B such that B |= ξ(b1, . . . , br+m, b). Let Pm+1 be the set of partial
P -isomorphisms q between A and B such that dom(q) = {a1, . . . , ar+m, a} and A |=
ξ(a1, . . . , ar+m, a) for ξ a complete (r+m+1, r+1)-condition, and (a1, . . . , ar+m) =
dom(p) for some p ∈ Pm. We then have p ∪ {〈a, b〉} ∈ Pm+1. The back condition is
proved in a similar way.
(ii’)⇒(i’): By induction on the complexity of formulas ψ. Suppose ψ ∈ Lrωω[τ, P+],
qr(ψ) ≤ n, m < n, p ∈ Pm, and a1, . . . , ar ∈ dom(p). The atomic case comes
from Definition 16. The connective cases are clear. Suppose ψ = ∃xφ, and
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A |= ψ(a1, . . . , ar). Then there is an element a ∈ A such that A |= φ(a1, . . . , ar, a).
Using the forth condition of Pm, take the element such that there is q ∈ Pm+1,
q ⊃ p, a ∈ dom(q), and A |= φ(a1, . . . , ar, a). By induction hypothesis B |=
φ(p(a1), . . . , p(ar), q(a)). Thus B |= φ(p(a1), . . . , p(ar), b), and therefore
B |= ψ(p(a1), . . . , p(ar)). 
Proof of Theorem 19. For each m ∈ ω, we construct θm ∈ Lωω[τ, P+] such that
Mod(φ) ⊆Mod(θm) as
θm =
∨
A∈Mod(φ)
∧
{χ : χ (m,0)-condition, and A |= χ}
That θm is in Lωω[τ, P+] follows from the fact that there are only finitely many
(m, 0)−conditions. (Lemma 23). Clearly, if A |= φ, then A |= θm for all m. So
Mod(φ) ⊆Mod(θm) for all m.
If there is a k ∈ ω such that Mod(θk) ∩ Mod(ψ) = ∅, take θ = θk. Suppose
to the contrary that there is no such k. In this case, there is Bk ∈ Mod(ψ) such
that Bk |=
∧{χ : χ (k,0)-condition, and Ak |= χ}, for some Ak ∈ Mod(φ), for each
k ∈ ω. So, we have Ak and Bk such that for all (k, 0)-conditions χ, Ak |= χ ⇒
Bk |= χ for each k. By Downward Löwenhein-Skolem property we can take Ak and
Bk countable infinite, and such that Ak = Bk. By Lemma 24 there is a sequence of
P -isomorphisms (Im)m≤k from Ak to Bk.
We now define a new model Ck with the same domain as Ak. First, we choose
any mapping from
⋃
m≤k Im into Ak. Its value under this mapping will be the code
of any partial P -isomorphism in
⋃
m≤k Im. Let pi be a renaming pi : τ → τ ′ such
that pi(S) = S for all S ∈ τ \ P , and pi(P ) = P ′.5 Let ρ be a renaming from τ ′
to a disjoint copy τ ′ of it, ρ : τ ′ → τ ′′. Let τ ∗ = τ ′ ∪ τ ′′ ∪ σ, where σ contains the
following relation symbols:
(1) Two unary relations H,U ;
(2) two binary relations <, I;
(3) one ternary relation G.
Let Ck be a τ ∪ τ ′-structure with the following interpretations:
(1) Ck  τ = Ak, Ck  τ ′ = Bk,
(2) UCk = {0, . . . , k},
(3) <Ck is the natural ordering on {0, . . . , k},
(4) P ′ is a renaming of P .
(5) HCkp iff p ∈ ⋃m≤k Im,
(6) ICkmp iff m ≤ k and p ∈ Im,
(7) GCkpab iff p ∈ ⋃m≤kHm(a), and p(a) = b.
Then Ck is a model of the conjunction θk of the following L∗[τ ∗]-sentences:
5We make the renaming of P to P ′ because a logic not closed under negation for P cannot
express A |= P (a) → B |= P (b), as we want to do in the construction of the P -back-and-forth
system for L∗.
ABSTRACT MODEL THEORY WITHOUT NEGATION 15
(1) φpi, ψpi.
(2) " < is a discrete linear ordering with a first element with at least k elements",
(3) "U is the field of <",
(4) "each p ∈ H is a partial P ′-isomorphism, that is,
∀p(H(p)→ ∀x∀y∀u∀v(G(p, x, u) ∧G(p, y, v)→ (x = y ↔ u = v))),
that accounts for the injectivity, together with, for example for T binary
∀p(H(p)→ ∀x∀y∀u∀v(G(p, x, u) ∧G(p, y, v)→ (T (x, y)↔ T (u, v))),
for every T ∈ τ ′/P ′, and
∀p(H(p)→ ∀x∀y∀u∀v(G(p, x, u) ∧G(p, y, v)→ (P ′(x, y)→ P ′(u, v))).
(5) "for each u ∈ U the set Iu is not empty", that is,
∀u(U(u)→ ∃p(H(p) ∧ I(u, p))),
(6) "the sequence of Iu’s has the forth property", that is,
∀u∀v(v < u→ ∀p(I(u, p)→ ∀x∃q∃y(I(v, q)
∧G(q, x, y) ∧ ∀z∀w(G(p, z, w)→ G(q, z, w)))),
(7) "the sequence of Iu’s has the back property", that is,
∀u∀v(v < u→ ∀p(I(u, p)→ ∀x∃q∃y(I(v, q)
∧G(q, y, x) ∧ ∀z∀w(G(p, z, w)→ G(q, z, w)))),
By compactness, the set {θk : k ∈ ω} has a model, and by Downward Löwenhein-
Skolem property a countable model D. Let A = D−pi  τ, and B = (D−pi  τ ′)−ρ.
Now let d0 >D
−pi
d1 >
D−pi . . . be the descending chain in D−pi. By compactness,
we may assume it exists. Let J = {p : ID−pidkp for some k}. Since D−pi is a
model of θ−pik , by (5) the set Ik is not empty and we can identify p with the partial
P -isomorphism {(a, b) : GD−pipab} from A to B. By (6) and (7), J has the FP -
back-and-forth property. Therefore J : A ∼=Pp B. By Lemma 13, A ∼=P B.
Since Mod(φ) is closed under P -isomorphisms, A |= φ implies B |= φ, but then
B ∈Mod(φ) ∩Mod(ψ), a contradiction. 
Let τ be any relational vocabulary and P a predicate symbol in τ . Let ψ, φ, θ ∈
Lωω[τ ]. Theorem 19 has as corollary a weaker form of Lyndon’s interpolation theo-
rem [Ly59]:
Corollary 25. Let ψ, φ be such that ψ |= φ. Then there is a sentence θ such that:
(i) ψ |= θ and θ |= φ.
(ii) θ contains only those predicate symbols that occur in both ψ and φ.
(iii) If ψ is P -positive, then so is θ.
Proof. Take L∗ in Theorem 19 to be the logic of classes K such that for some
χ ∈ Lωω[τ ], A ∈ K iff there is B such that B |= χ and B τ= A. Let τ1 be the
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vocabulary of ψ, and τ2 that of φ, and suppose P occurs only positively in ψ. Let
K1,K2 ∈ L∗ be such that:
A ∈ K1 iff there is B such that B |= ψ and B τ1= A.
A ∈ K2 iff there is B such that B |= ¬φ and B τ2= A.
Then K1 ∩K2 = ∅, and K1 is closed under P -isomorphisms. By Theorem 19,
there is a θ ∈ Lωω[τ, P+] such that K1 ⊆ Mod(θ) and K2 ∩Mod(θ) = ∅. Then
ψ |= θ and θ |= φ. 
3.2. Lindström’s theorem for extensions of Lωω.
Lindström’s theorem can be extended so that other than first-order logic can have
a model-theoretic characterization. What closure properties must a logic preserve
with respect to first-order logic in order to be characterized by compactness and the
Downward Löwenhein-Skolem property? Let us look at the proof of Lindström’s
theorem. It works by contradiction using compactness and Downward Löwenhein-
Skolem property in the construction of an isomorphism between two models that
belong to disjoint classes. Negation is needed to express the fact that the two
models belong to disjoint classes: A |= φ and B |= ¬φ. Can we work on a proof for
Lindström’s theorem without negation?
3.2.1. Countable Extensions without Negation.
We start with the case of countable logics, those in which L[τ ] is countable for
τ countable. Examples of countable logics are first-order logic, second order logic,
the logic of PC classes, and the extension of first-order logic by countably many
generalized quantifiers.
We present a countable logic L, not closed under negation, compact and with the
Löwenheim-Skolem property, that has infinitely many extensions each of which is
compact and has the Löwenheim-Skolem property. In fact, we prove that if a logic
L which is compact and has the Löwenheim-Skolem property is extended countably
many times, the extended logic cannot be a maximal logic with respect to those
two properties. In particular, if we consider the starting logic to be the logic of PC
classes over first-order logic, this counterexample shows that Hintikka’s IF logic
[Hi96] does not have a Lindström’s characterization, in the sense that compactness
and Löwenheim-Skolem properties may hold in an extension of it.
Let τ be a vocabulary consisting of two 3-ary relation symbols τ = {P,M},
where P stands for addition andM for multiplication. Let T be a positive complete
first-order τ -theory extending PA. We can construct such positive theory replacing
each ¬P (x, y, z) by ∃u(P (x, y, u) ∧ u 6= z). Now, u 6= z can be written as ∃v(v >
0 ∧ (P (u, v, z) ∨ P (z, v, u)). We do not have > in our language, so we write v > 0
as ∃wP (1, w, v). Now we still have to eliminate the occurrence of constant 1. But
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t = 1 is equivalent to "∀xM(x, t, x)". The replacement of ”¬M(x, y, z)” works in a
similar way. It is essential that we get rid of all negations. Let QT be the class of
models of T . Consider an abstract sentence φ such that Modτ (φ) = Modτ (T ). We
write φ by means of a generalized quantifier QT .
φ := QTxyzuvwP (x, y, z)M(u, v, w)
The satisfaction relation for QT is:
A |= QTxyzuvwθ(x, y, z)η(u, v, w)↔ (A, θA(x, y, z), ηA(u, v, w)) |= T.
The picture is as follows: Let A be a model in any vocabulary that leads to
formulas in three free variables. A is a model of Qxyzθ(x, y, z)η(u, v, w), if there
is a τ -model of T that has the same domain as A, and in which the set of triples
that satisfies P (x, y, z) (resp. M(u, v, w)) is equal to the set of triples that satisfies
θ(x, y, z) (resp. η(u, v, w)) in A.
Finally, we define the logic LQT as the logic that results from adding to the
logic PC(Lω,ω) the class QT , and closing under the PC-operation. LQT extends
PC(Lω,ω).
Proposition 26. LQT is a proper extension of PC(Lω,ω).
Proof. By Gödel-Rosser incompleteness theorem, which says that no complete ex-
tension of PA is recursively enumerable, it is enough to show that PC-classes are
recursively enumerable. So let τ ′ ⊆ τ be vocabularies, θ be a τ -sentence, and
K = [Mod(θ)]  τ ′. Let T be the set of first-order τ ′-sentences that are true in all
models in K. Given a first-order τ ′-sentence ψ, ψ ∈ T ↔ |= θ → ψ. 
We want to prove that LQT is compact and satisfies the Löwenheim-Skolem prop-
erty. It is enough to show that LQT is a sublogic of a compact logic that satisfies
the Löwenheim-Skolem property (See [BF85], p.45).
Proposition 27. If L is a logic such that every class in EC(L) is in PC∆(Lω,ω),
then L is compact and satisfies the Löwenheim-Skolem property.
Proof. To prove compactness, let Φ be a countable set of L-sentences in a vo-
cabulary τ . Suppose Φ is finitely satisfiable. By hypothesis, for every sentence
φi ∈ Φ, there is a first-order theory Si in an extended vocabulary τ ′i such that
Modτ ′i (Si)  τ = Modτ (φi). For each pair φi, φj, we make the extension τi − τ dis-
joint from τj − τ . As Φ is finitely satisfiable, any finite intersection of the classes of
models of the Si’s is non empty. By compactness of first-order logic, the intersection
of them all is non empty, and thus Φ has a model.
For Löwenheim-Skolem, suppose φ ∈ L has an infinite model. Then there is a
countable first-order theory S in an extended language whose class of models is a
class that contains the expansion to the extended language of each model of φ, and
therefore it has an infinite model. As first-order logic satisfies Löwenheim-Skolem
for countable sets of sentences, S has a countable model, and therefore φ has a
countable model. 
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Proposition 28. Every τ -elementary class in LQT is in PC∆(Lω,ω).
Proof. We prove by induction on the complexity of formulas, that for every formula
in LQT , there is a set of formulas S ⊂ L[τ ′], such that Modτ (φ) = {A  τ : A |=
S(τ ′)}, where τ ⊆ τ ′.
For simplicity we assume the language of T consists of the predicate P only. The
general case presents no new difficulties. Thus, the new quantifier isQTxyzφ(x, y, z).
Suppose also that τ ′ = τ ∪ {R}, with R unary. The sentence QTxyzP (x, y, z) is
equivalent by assumption to ∃PT (P ). Now suppose η is of the form ∃R∧S(R),
we prove QTxyzP (x, y, z) ∧ η is in PC∆. By assumption, QT is axiomatized by
∃PT (P ). PC∆ is closed under conjunction, so we are done. The case of dis-
junction is proved in a similar way. Now suppose η := QTxyzφ(x, y, z, ~u). So
assume φ(x, y, z, ~u) defines a PC∆ class. That means that there is a new pred-
icate R, and a set of formulas S(x, y, z, ~u) = {ηi(x, y, z, ~u) : i ∈ ω} such that
Modτ (φ) = Modτ∪{R}(S)  τ . On the other hand, by definition, QTxyzφ(x, y, z, ~u)
is equivalent to T (φ(x, y, z, ~u)/P ), where T (φ(x, y, z, ~u)/P ) is the theory resulting
of replacing everywhere in T P by φ(x, y, z, ~u). By induction hypothesis, if A is
a model of φ(x, y, z, ~u), A is the reduct of a model of S(x, y, z). So if we take all
models of φ(x, y, z, ~u) such that (A, φA) |= T , these models have an expansion to
a model of T ′, where T ′ is the result of substituting P in T by ∃RS(x, y, z). We
conclude that QTxyzφ(x, y, z, ~x) is equivalent to a reduct of a model of T ′, in the
sense that any model of QTxyzφ(x, y, z, ~x) has an expansion to a model of T ′. The
only thing we have to prove is that
∧
n η
′
n, for η′n ∈ T ′, defines a PC∆, that is, T
of the form ∃R∧n ψn. Let T = {ηn : n ∈ ω}, and S = {θm(x, y, z) : m ∈ ω}.
Now, to get η′n, we have to substitute in ηn P by ∃R
∧
m θm(x, y, z). So, as T does
not have negation, a typical sentence in T ′ is of the form
(1) η′n = Qxyz∃R
∧
m
θm(x, y, z)
where Q stands for a sequence of quantifiers.
We have to describe how to get a PC∆ form from (1). Not having negation will
allow us to do that. By allowing R to be binary, we can swap its position with the
universal quantifier, using the Tarski-Kuratowski algorithm. We prove
(2) A |= ∀x∃R
∧
m
θm(x, y, z) iff A |= ∃R0∀x
∧
m
θ∗m(x, y, z)
where θ∗m(x, y, z) is the result of replacing R(t) by R0(x, t) in θm(x, y, z)
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A |= ∀x∃Rθm(x, y, z) iff(3)
for some R0, for all a ∈ A,A |= ∃R
∧
m
θm(a, y, z) iff(4)
for some R0, for all a ∈ A, (A, R0(a, t)) |=
∧
m
θ∗m(a, y, z) iff(5)
(A, R0(x, t)) |= ∀x
∧
m
θ∗m(x, y, z) iff(6)
A |= ∃R0∀x
∧
m
θ∗m(x, y, z)(7)
Which in turn is equivalent to
(8) A |= ∃R0
∧
m
∀xθ∗m(x, y, z),
which finishes the proof of (2).
The existential second order quantifier commutes with the existential quantifier.
Now we have each η′n of the form
∃Rn0 , . . . , Rnln
∧
m
ξnm.
If we take the conjunction of all we get
(9)
∧
n
∃Rn0 , . . . , Rnln
∧
m
ξnm
This is equivalent to (10) below, since each two sequences Ri0, . . . , Rili and R
j
0, . . . , R
j
lj
are disjoint.
(10) ∃R00, . . . , R0l0 , . . . , Ri0, . . . , Rili , . . .
∧
n,m
ξnm
And we reached the desired PC∆ form. 
Corollary 29. LQT satisfies the compactness theorem and the Downward Löwenhein-
Skolem properties, and extends PC. 
Corollary 29 is generalized by the following
Theorem 30. If L is any countable logic, then it is not maximal with respect to
compactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem property, not even in the family of count-
able logics.
Proof. Take T as above to be a complete extension of PA. There are 2ℵ0 such
complete extensions (see, for instance [Ka], p.39). So, as L has only countably
many classes in the vocabulary {P,M}, there must be a complete extension T of
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PA which is not definable in L. So, we get an extension of L by adding QT to
it. Call this extension L∗. To show that L∗ is compact and have the Löwenheim-
skolem property, we just have to find an extension of it with these two properties.
Given the closure properties of L, and the form of T (it is a positive theory) the
same argument that we used for the proofs of Propositions 27 and 28, shows that
PC∆(L) is compact, satisfies the Löwenheim-Skolem property, and that it extends
L∗, therefore L∗ is compact and has the Löwenheim-Skolem property. 
3.2.2. Uncountable Extensions without Negation.
In this section we introduce the method of partial reduction, which is a method
in the study of logics without negation that does not have a clear counter-part in
the context where we do have negation. So this is a method characteristic to the
special circumstances of our investigation.
The first natural uncountable extension to look at is PC∆(Lωω). We prove in
this section it is not a maximal logic with respect to compactness and Löwenheim-
Skolem properties. Although in a later section we will prove no such extension exists
if we restrict to small logics (logics with a set number of model classes), it is still
interesting to observe the method we have to use due to the lack of negation. The
existence of the largest logic with compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem properties
remains an open problem. In a later section we prove no such logic exists if we
consider compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem down to ℵ1.
Definition 31. Let Q be a generalized quantifier. We call Lωω(Q) the logic obtained
by adding the quantifier Q to Lωω and closing under conjunction, disjunction, exis-
tential and universal quantification and Q-projection, but not negation.
Definition 32. Suppose K is a class of models. Suppose L and L′ are logics. We
say that L is partially K-reducible to L′ if for any φ ∈ L there is φ∗ ∈ L′, such that
φ→ φ∗ in all models, and φ↔ φ∗ in models in K.
Lemma 33. Let Q be a quantifier, and K a class of models. If for any first-order
formula φ(~x, ~y), Q~xφ(~x, ~y) is partially K-reducible to first order logic, then so is the
whole logic Lωω(Q).
Proof. We prove this by induction on the formation of formulas. Suppose φ(~x) ∈
Lωω(Q) is partially K-reducible. Call φr(~x) its partial K-reduction to first-order
logic.
The Boolean cases are clear. Suppose η(~y) = ∃xφ(x, ~y). By induction hypothesis,
φ(x, ~y) has a partial K-reduction, φr(x, ~y), so we define ηr(~y) := ∃xφr(x, ~y). Then
η(~y) → ηr(~y) in all models, and the converse is valid in K-models. For Q suppose
η(~y) = Q~xφ(~x, ~y). We assume θ(P ) to be the partial reduction of Q~xP (~x), where
each occurrence of P in θ is positive. Suppose A |= Q~xφ(~x, ~y). By induction
hypothesis, φ has a partial K-reduction φ. By definition, there is a model C ∈
Mod(Q~xP (~x)) with the same domain as A such that φA = P C. By assumption C
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is a model of θ(P ). For any model B, φB ⊆ φBr , so by substitution there exists a
sentence θ∗, obtained from θ by replacing everywhere P by φr(~x, ~y). Clearly A |= θ∗.
Now suppose A |= θ∗ and A ∈ K. By assumption A |= θ(P ) iff A |= Q~xP (~x). By
substitution, there is a sentence Q~xφr(~x, ~y), obtained from Q~xP (~x). Then A |=
θ∗ iff A |= Q~xφr(~x, ~y), that in K is equivalent to say that A |= Q~xφ(~x, ~y). 
Lemma 34. Let K be a class of models containing all countable models. Suppose
L is partially K-reducible to a compact logic with the Downward Löwenhein-Skolem
property for countable sets of sentences L′. Then L is compact.
Proof. Let Φ be a finitely satisfiable set of L-sentences. Let Φ∗ be the set of
L′ -sentences that are the partial reductions of each sentence in Φ. Φ∗ is finitely
satisfiable, for take any finite set Σ∗ ⊂ Φ∗, and look at the corresponding set of
sentences Σ ⊂ Φ. By hypothesis, Σ has a model, and it is a model of each of the
sentences in Σ∗, so Φ∗ is finitely satisfiable. By compactness, it has a model, and
by Downward Löwenhein-Skolem theorem for countable sets of sentences, it has a
countable modelM. AsM is a countable model of each sentence in Φ∗, it is a model
of each sentence in Φ. 
Lemma 35. Let K be a class of models containing all countable models. Suppose L
is partially K-reducible to a logic L′ with the Downward Löwenhein-Skolem property.
Then L satisfies Downward Löwenhein-Skolem property.
Proof. Let φ be an L-sentence with an infinite model. Let φ∗ be a partial K-
reduction of φ to L′. By Downward Löwenhein-Skolem theorem, φ∗ has a countable
model, and by definition of partial reduction, φ has also a countable model. 
Definition 36. Let Q be a generalized quantifier. Define PC∆(Q) as the logic
obtained by adding Q to PC∆, and closing under the PC∆-operation.
Lemma 37. Let K be a model class containing all countable models. If Q is par-
tially K-reducible to Lωω, then PC∆(Q) is compact and satisfies the Downward
Löwenhein-Skolem property.
Proof. For compactness, let Φ be a finitely satisfiable countable set of PC∆(Q)-
sentences. That means that there is an extended vocabulary (it can be countable),
in which we have a finitely satisfiable countable set of Lωω(Q)-sentences. By the
compactness result proved above, this set has a model. The reduction of this model
to the initial vocabulary is a model for Φ. For Downward Löwenhein-Skolem prop-
erty, we argue similarly. Let φ ∈ PC∆(Q)[τ ], with a model M. Then there is an
extended vocabulary τ ′ and a sentence φ∗ ∈ Lωω(Q)[τ ′] that has a modelM′ that is
an expansion of M to the vocabulary τ ′. By the result proved above, this sentence
has a countable model N. The reduction to the initial vocabulary of this model, is
a countable model for φ. 
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Definition 38. Let Q1, Q2 be two quantifiers. We say that Q1 is partially K-
reducible to Q2 if for all φ(x) ∈ Lωω(Q1), |= Q1xφ(x) → Q2xφ(x) in all models,
and |= Q2xφ(x) → Q1xφ(x) in models in K. If Q2 is first order definable, we say
that Q1 is partially K-reducible, or that we can K-reduce Q1.
Proposition 39. Let K be a model class that contains all countable models. Let
H1 be such that H1xφ(x)↔ ((Q1xφ(x)→ ∀xφ(x)) ∧ ∃xφ(x)). Lωω(H1) is partially
K-reducible to first order logic.
Proof. H1 is partially K-reducible. Indeed
|= ((Q1xφ(x)→ ∀xφ(x)) ∧ ∃xφ(x))→ ∃xφ(x), and
|= ∃xφ(x)→ ((Q1xφ(x)→ ∀xφ(x)) ∧ ∃xφ(x)) in countable models.
We can apply this reduction to H1xφ(x) as many times as necessary to get a first-
order sentence. Finally, we apply Lemma 33. 
Proposition 40. Lωω(H1) is not in PC∆.
Proof. The sentence ∃xH1y(x 6= y) has no uncountable models. But PC∆ has
Upward Löwenhein-Skolem property, so H1 /∈ PC∆. 
Corollary 41. PC∆ is not a maximal logic with respect to Compactness and Down-
ward Löwenhein-Skolem properties. 
In Section 5, we will prove that actually there is no maximal small logic with
respect to compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem properties. The question is open
for class logics, although we will also prove there is no such thing as the greatest
logic which is compact and satisfies the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem down to ℵ1.
4. Maximality and Interpolation
As said in the introduction, we present the connection between maximality and in-
terpolation in the framework of back-and-forth systems. Two recent works [BvB99],
[M00] study the relations between back and forth systems and interpolation. The
strategy for proving interpolation theorems begins by finding an appropriate back
and forth system for the logic. However, the existence of back and forth systems
does not guarantee the success in finding interpolation theorems. As a list of neg-
ative results, in the case of extensions with generalized quantifiers, the main result
of Caicedo says no extension of first-order logic by means of an arbitrary number of
monadic quantifiers satisfies interpolation. Mostowski [Mo68] has a similar result
in the case on a finite number of generalized quantifiers of arbitrary type. In this
section we address the case of infinitary logics, although the conclusions extend to
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any logic. L∞ω and Lκω for κ = iκ both a have a back-and-forth system, a Lind-
ström’s type theorem [B71], but not interpolation. On the other hand, Lω1ω has
interpolation but no Lindström’s type characterization. We try to give a framework
that connects interpolation and maximality and yet it is able to explain all these
"anomalies".
We start by deriving Lindström’s and interpolation theorems for first-order logic
from a common source theorem, that is a generalization of Theorem 19, and that is
proved in a similar way:
Theorem 42 (Separation Theorem). Let L∗ be a compact logic with Downward
Löwenhein-Skolem property. Let K1 and K2 be two disjoint L∗-classes. Then there
is a first-order sentence θ in the common language of K1 and K2 that separates
them.
Corollary 43 (Lindström’s maximality theorem). Lωω is a maximal compact logic
with negation satisfying the Löwenheim-Skolem property.
Proof. Let L∗ be closed under negation. 
Corollary 44 (Craig’s interpolation theorem). [Cr57] Any two disjoint PC(Lωω)-
classes can be separated by an EC(Lωω)-class.
Proof. Take L∗ to be the logic of PC(Lωω) classes. 
There are many compact extensions of Lωω with LS. Corollary 45 shows that
they obey a very strong lack of negation: the only sentences with negation are the
first-order ones. Also at this point we notice how important is the fact that first-
order logic is closed under negation, for the above corollaries do not behave similarly
if we give negation up. Indeed, we saw in Section 3.1 that Theorem 19, analogous
to Theorem 42, gives as corollary an interpolation theorem, but no characterization
theorem exists for the logic Lωω[P+]. This logic has separation, but is not maximal
with respect to compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem property. We can summarize
this phenomena by saying that the PC extension of a compact logic with LS and
some Karp property preserve compactness, LS and the Karp property on countable
models, hence making the logic to satisfy separation, but new classes can be added
freely, since the fact that the logic is not closed under negation does not restrict
new classes to existing ones.
Corollary 45. If L∗ is a compact extension of Lωω with LS, then the only sentences
of L∗ that have negation are the first-order ones. 
This is related to the fact that the ∆-extension of a Lωω is closed under Q-
projection. That is, any compact and LS class Q whose complement is compact
and LS is such that Lωω(Q) is automatically closed under Q.
Now we try to generalize these ideas for logics other than Lωω. The following table
contains a number of logics and their respective satisfaction of interpolation and
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generalized forms of Lindström’s type maximality theorems. The model theoretic
properties in the box for LT are the characterizing ones:
Logic Lindström’s theorem Interpolation theorem
Lωω Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem. [L69] YES [Cr57]
L∞ω Boundedness and Karp property. [B71] NO [Ma71]
Lκ,ω Well ordering number ≤ κ NO [Ma71]
(κ = iκ) and Karp property. [B71]
Lω1ω NONE YES [L-E65]
L1κ Löwenheim-Skolem and strong form YES [ShV04]
of undefinability of well order. [ShV04]
Lωω[P
+] NONE YES
Next definition introduces a relation R involved in the description of the back-
and-forth system of a logic.
Definition 46. Let τ be a vocabulary, R a binary relation between structures, and
ϕ a sentence of a logic L.
(1) We say that ϕ is R-invariant if
ARB and A |= ϕ imply B |= ϕ
Denote the class of R-invariant sentences as LR. In case L = LR, we say L
is a logic of R-invariant sentences.
(2) We say that ϕ entails ψ along R, written ϕ |=R ψ, iff for all τ -structures A
and B, if ARB, and A |= ϕ then B |= ψ.
Next theorem is introduced as a starting point of a generalized study of the
Separation Theorem. It appeared in [Fl85].
Theorem 47. Suppose there is given for any vocabulary τ a set Φτ ⊆ Lωω[τ ] and
let Rτ =Mod(Φτ ). Assume that R is a binary relation between structures such that
ARB implies A,B ∈ R for some τ . Suppose that
(1) R restricted to τ -structures is an equivalence relation.
(2) R is invariant under renamings.
(3) Given τ , for some τ ′ ⊇ τ , there are Lωω[τ ′]-sentences ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . such that
for any τ -structures A,B, the following hold:
a. ARB iff (A,B, . . . ) |= {ϕi : i ∈ ω} for some choice of . . . , and
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b. for n ∈ ω the relation Rn on R given by
ARnB iff (A,B, . . . ) |= {ϕi : i ≤ n} for some . . .
has the following two properties:
a.1. Rn is an equivalence relation on Rτ ;
a.2. For A ∈ Rτ , there is ψnA ∈ Lωω[τ ] such that for B ∈ Rτ :
ARnB iff B |= ψnA.
Then
• If L∗ ≥ LRωω is a compact logic of R-invariant sentence not necessarily closed
under negation, then any two L∗-classes can be separated by an LRωω-class.
Hence, among the logics of R-invariant sentences closed under negation, LRωω
is a maximal compact logic.

As Flum pointed out, we could generalized this theorem to any logic L with
a given property R, which must satisfy the above plus some further conditions
depending on L. So let L have any given generalized compactness property C, and
let L∗ be an extension of LR satisfying C, not necessarily closed under negation.
Our research program consist in being able to proof the following, that contains a
small addenda to Flum’s original result:
(F1) If L is itself a logic of R-invariant sentences, and L∗ is closed under negation,
we obtain that among logics of invariant R-sentences, L is a maximal logic
which satisfies C.
(F2) Let φ, ψ ∈ L∗ be such that φ entails ¬ψ along R (note that L∗ does not
necessarily have to be closed under negation. Then there is an LR-class that
separates Mod(φ) and Mod(ψ).
Example 48 (Lindström’s maximality theorem citeLin69). Lωω is a maximal com-
pact logic with negation and the Löwenheim-Skolem property.
Proof. Let L be Lωω, and R be the relation of partial isomorphism ∼=p. Let
L∗ be compact and closed under negation. It suffices to show that any logic with
Löwenheim-Skolem property has the Karp property. We postpone this proof till
Proposition 50.
Corollary 49 (Craig’s interpolation theorem [Cr57]). Any two disjoint PC(Lωω)-
classes can be separated by an EC(Lωω)-class. 
Proof. Let L∗ be the logic of PC(Lωω)-classes, and R the relation of partial iso-
morphisms. PC is not invariant under Karp property, but it is enough for us to
prove the following proposition, that it is also the bit of information we need for
completing the proof of Example 48.
The following proposition, with a slight variation, appears in [BvB99].
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Proposition 50. Let L be a regular logic with LS. Let φ ∈ PC(L) and ψ ∈
cPC(L). Then the following are equivalent:
(1) φ entails ψ along ∼=.
(2) φ entails ψ along ∼=p.
Proof. The proof of (2) implies (1) is trivial. Now suppose there are τ -structures
such that we have
A ∼=p B, A |= φ and B |= ¬ψ.
If A and B are countable we are done, since partially isomorphic countable struc-
tures are isomorphic. Let I, V,W be new unary predicates; and G be one new
ternary relation. Set τ ′ = τ ∪{I, V,W.G}. Let ξ be the conjunction of the following
L[τ ′]-sentences:
“V and W are disjoint"
φ{x:V (x)},
¬ψ{x:W (x)},
“each p ∈ I is a mapping from V to W" that is,
∀p(I(p)→ ∀x∀y(Gpxy → (V (x) ∧W (y)))
“each p ∈ I is a partial injective mapping" that is,
∀p(I(p)→ ∀x∀y∀u∀v(G(p, x, u) ∧G(p, y, v)→ (x = y ↔ u = v))),
“each p ∈ I preserves all the symbols in τ" for example, for binary T ∈ τ ,
∀p(I(p)→ ∀x∀y∀u∀v(G(p, x, u) ∧G(p, y, v)→ (T (x, y)↔ T (u, v))),
“the set I is not empty"
“the set I has the forth property", that is,
∀p(I(p)→ ∀x(V (x)→ ∃q∃y(I(q) ∧G(q, x, y) ∧ ∀z∀w(G(p, z, w)→ G(q, z, w))))),
“the set I has the back property.”
Then a model whose relativizations to V and W are isomorphic to A and B,
respectively, is a model of ξ, since by hypothesis A and B are partially isomorphic,
A |= φ and B |= ¬ψ. By Downward Löwenhein-Skolem property ξ has a countable
model C. But then we obtain two countable structures A′ = CV and B′ = CW , that
are partially isomorphic, and therefore isomorphic, such that A′ |= φ and B′ |= ¬ψ,
a contradiction.
If we take ψ = φ ∈ L, then we get the proof that regular logics with negation and
LS have the Karp property. 
Let us see the case for L∞ω. As Flum points out in [Fl85], adding for each ordinal
α in Theorem 47, a relation Rα, instead of Rn, with set many equivalence classes,
we can prove
Corollary 51 (Barwise’s characterization for L∞ω). L∞ω is a maximal bounded
logic with negation and the Karp property.
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Proof. Let L = L∞ω. Let R in (F1), page 29, be the relation of partial isomorphism,
and L∗ a bounded logic closed under negation. 
The following is the associated interpolation theorem6. It is not a full interpolation
theorem, for L∞ω does not satisfy LS, hence neither PC(L∞ω) does, and thus
Proposition 50 does not apply.
Corollary 52 (Barwise-van Benthem interpolation theorem for L∞ω). [BvB99]
Given ψ ∈ PC(L∞,ω), and φ ∈ cPC(L∞,ω), the following are equivalent:
(1) ψ entails φ along ∼=p.
(2) There is a sentence θ of L∞ω, such that ψ |= θ and θ |= φ.
The proof of this theorem as given in [BvB99] is very similar to the proof of
maximality for L∞ω. We treat this theorem as an application of point (2) of the
generalized program after theorem Theorem 47.
Proof of Corollary 52. Let R in (F2), page 29, be the relation of partial isomor-
phism, and C boundedness. Let L∗ = PC(L∞ω). 
This theorem has as corollary a result that already appeared in [MShS76]:
Corollary 53. If K is closed under partial isomorphism and K and K are PC in
L∞ω, then K is EC in L∞ω. 
But since ∆-extension does not preserve the Karp property [MShS76], we do not
even have ∆-interpolation for L∞ω.
On the grounds of the previous considerations, Barwise and van Benthem argue
that interpolation7 theorem should be understood as:
(∗) “A logic L has interpolation if given two PC(L)-classes K1 = Mod(φ),K2 =
Mod(ψ), if φ entails ψ along R, then K1 and K2 can be separated by an EC(L)-
class.”
Similar ‘interpolation theorems’ could be proved for Lκ,ω, κ = iκ and Lω1ω. From
López-Escobar [L-E65], we know the latter has the full interpolation, while the
result provided by an adaptation of Corollary 52 for Lω1ω is only partial. Barwise
and van Benthem [BvB99] asked whether it would be possible to make some change
in Corollary 52, so that we get the full interpolation theorem for Lω1ω. We see
here that this is perhaps not possible, for separation is essentially a Lindström’s
6The motivation of Barwise and van Benthem in their paper was to state interpolation theorems
by finding the absolute version of the predicate R. We do not talk about this here, but rather use
their generalization of interpolation to relate interpolation to maximality theorems.
7This statement is a slight change of what they have. For them, R is the absolute version of
the invariance of L, found for the sake of the interpolation theorem -and such that maybe L is not
R-invariant. For us, R is the invariance of L, for the sake of maximality.
28 MARTA GARCÍA-MATOS
theorem, and Lω1ω does not have any Lindström type characterization8. That is,
the interpolation theorem can be proved for Lω1ω per se, but it cannot at present
time be understood as a corollary of Theorem 47.
Is there any logic besides first-order with a maximality and a full interpolation
theorem? In [ShV04], Shelah and Väänänen construct a new infinitary logic L1κ
between Lκ,ω and Lκ,κ characterized by a Löwenheim-Skolem property and a sub-
stitute of compactness. Both properties are preserved by the PC operation. They
achieve this way a new logic satisfying Lindström’s and Craig’s theorems.
The Barwise-van Benthem interpolation theorem can be stated in a negationless
form.
Definition 54. Let φ and ψ be two sentences in PC(L∞ω).
(1) We say that φ contradicts ψ along partial isomorphism (p.i.) if no model of
φ is partially isomorphic to a model of ψ.
(2) We say that φ has a negation along p.i. if there is another sentence ψ such
that no model of φ is partially isomorphic to a model of ψ, and also any
model is partially isomorphic to either a model of φ or a model of ψ.
Theorem 55. Let φ and ψ be two sentences in PC(L∞ω). If φ contradicts ψ along
p.i. then there is a sentence of L∞ω that separates φ and ψ.
So an abstract version of this theorem says
Theorem 56. Let L∗ be an abstract logic that is bounded, and φ, ψ ∈ L∗. If φ
contradicts ψ along p.i. then there is a sentence of L∞ω that separates φ and ψ.
As in the case of Lωω, a consequence is that only the sentences in L∗ that are
already in L∞ω have a negation along p.i.
Concluding remarks: The (generalizable) schema of the relation between Lind-
ström Characterization Theorem and Craig Interpolation Theorem remains as fol-
lows:
(1) Lωω is the maximal logic with negation, Karp property and Compactness.
(2) With the same argument used to prove last statement, we can prove PC(Lωω)
has separation if we restrict to entailment along partial isomorphism.
(3) Because Lωω has LS, which is preserved by the PC-operation, and LS im-
plies entailment along partial isomorphism is equivalent to entailment along
isomorphism, PC(Lωω) has full separation, and hence Lωω has interpolation.
In the case of logics closed under negation, we only find compact extensions of
Lωω among logics with generalized quantifiers (because infinitary logics are not
8In the case of propositional extensions of Lω1,ω, (see [GH76], [Ha80]), Harrington [Ha80] proved
there are such extensions that continue to have the same model theoretic properties as Lω1,ω, if
we restrict to admissible fragments. Gostanian and Hrbacek proved in [GH76], not restricting
to admissible fragments, that among propositional extensions of Lω1,ω, only Lω1,ω itself warrants
interesting model theoretic properties.
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compact). But what happens with generalized quantifiers, and their corresponding
back-and-forth relation ∼=Q, is that their Karp properties are unique for each one,
so if L(Q) is such compact extension, we can prove that PC(L(Q)) has separation
if we restrict to entailment along ∼=Q. Now the difficult part is to find a property
that would make entailment along an analog ∼=Q of partial isomorphism equivalent
to entailment along ∼=, so that the L(Q) will have full interpolation. Is there a
property that would make ∼=Q equivalent to entailment along ∼= in this case?
A similar schema for logics without negation can be stated:
(1) Lωω is the maximal logic with negation, Karp property and Compactness.
(2) With the same argument used to prove last statement, we can prove PC(Lωω)
has separation if we restrict to contradiction along partial isomorphism.
(3) Because Lωω has LS, which is preserved by the PC-operation, and LS im-
plies contradiction along partial isomorphism is equivalent to contradiction
along isomorphism, PC(Lωω) has full separation, and hence Lωω has sepa-
ration.
5. Other maximality results
We have seen several cases of logics with model theoretic characterizations. We
have seen the importance of Karp properties in the relation between interpolation
and maximality. We now consider a model theoretic property, and then we try to
establish whether it is relevant to interpolation, study the orderings of the family
of all logics with respect to this model theoretic property, and look for maximal
points. That way we can have an idea of the possible characterizations a logic can
be expected to have.
In the literature, there are already some examples. Väänänen and Krynicki
[VK82] studied the orderings of all logics; Sgro [Sg77] proved that in the order-
ing of logics with the Łos’ ultraproduct property, there is a maximal logic with this
property; Lipparini [Li87] proved that there is a maximal logic that extends a given
logic L and has the same complete extensions as L; Wacławek [W78] proved there is
a maximal logic with Löwenheim-Skolem property over any logic with this property.
All these maximal logics enjoy the ∆-interpolation theorem, which is a weakening
of interpolation theorem. It is an open problem whether there is a maximal logic in
the ordering of compact logics.
Of particular interest would be the existence of a maximal logic with Karp prop-
erty9. Since Löwenheim-Skolem property implies Karp property, and the converse
is true for logics with interpolation (cf. [Fl85] p. 95), it is also of interest to study
the ordering of logics with the Löwenheim-Skolem property. For this reason, as
well as for methodological reasons, we reproduce here the proof of Wacławek on the
existence of a maximal logic with respect to the Löwenheim-Skolem property. The
∆-interpolation theorem separation theorem for this logic follows straightforwardly.
9However, this is an open problem. L∞ω is a maximal logic with respect to Karp property if we
chose the relation of extension between two logics to be:“L <≡ L′ iff for all τ and all A,B ∈ Str[τ ],
if A ≡L′ B then A ≡L B
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We will be able to appreciate the essential differences between these proofs and
those of the previous section, as well as to understand what a proof of interpolation
would need.
Theorem 57 (Wacławek [W78]). Let (LS,≤) be the ordering of logics closed under
negation and conjunction that satisfy the Löwenheim-Skolem property. For any logic
L ∈ (LS,≤), there is a maximal logic L′ ∈ (LS,≤) such that L ≤ L′.
Proof. Each sentence in a logic L with the Löwenheim-Skolem property is deter-
mined by its countable models, i.e. two different sentences in L do not have the
same countable models, by definition.
We show there are at most 2ℵ0 countable non-isomorphic models of finite vocab-
ulary. Let τ = {T1, . . . , Tn} be a vocabulary, and let mi be the arity of Ti. Let A
be a countable set, and let ci = |{f : f is a function from Ami to {0, 1}}|. Then the
number s of models of vocabulary τ and domain A is s = Πi=1,...,nci but ci = 2ℵ0 for
all i, so s = (2ℵ0)n = 2ℵ0 .
So there are at most 22ℵ0 possible classes of countable non-isomorphic models,
and hence every well-ordered chain in (LS,≤) has length smaller than (22ℵ0 )+.
Now we show that the union of an increasing sequence of logics L′ with L ≤ L′
is a supremum of this family of logics. Let L∗ = ⋃α Lα, where Lα ∈ (LS,≤), and
Lδ ≤ Lγ for δ ≤ γ, and suppose L∗ /∈ (LS,≤). Then there is some θ ∈ L∗ with a
model but no countable models. But θ ∈ Lα for some α, a contradiction.
By Zorn’s Lemma, there is a maximal logic L∗∗ ∈ (LS,≤) extending L. 
The following result is quite obvious but still worth mentioning because we have
been unable to decide whether any logic with negation and maximal with respect
to the Löwenheim-Skolem property satisfies the interpolation theorem.
Proposition 58. Any logic with negation and maximal with respect to the Löwenheim-
Skolem property satisfies the ∆-interpolation theorem.
Proof. Let L be a maximal logic with the Löwenheim-Skolem property, and let K,
and K be two PC-classes in L. Suppose K is not an EC(L)-class. Then we can
add K as a new EC(L)-class, and get the extension L′ closing under negation and
intersection. We prove that L′ satisfies Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, contradicting
the hypothesis that L is a maximal logic in (LS,≤).
K has countable models, because it is a class of reducts of models of a sentence
of L, and similarly for K, M ∩K, and M ∩K. This proof involves nothing more
than the known fact that the ∆-extension of L preserves LS.
Corollary 59. Any logic with negation has a maximal extension with the same
Löwenheim number. Moreover, this extension satisfies the ∆-interpolation theorem.
Proof. Let L be a logic with Löweheim number κ. Consider the ordering of logics
with Löwenheim number κ. By an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 57,
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there is a maximal logic L′ extending L. By an argument similar to that of the
proof of Proposition 58, L′ satisfies the ∆-interpolation theorem. 
Now we study the orderings of logics not necessarily closed under negation, with
respect to compactness and and Löwenheim-Skolem properties. We see there is no
maximal set logic (cf. Definition 14.5 ) with respect to compactness and Löwenheim-
Skolem properties.
Theorem 60. If we do not assume negation, no set logic is maximal with respect
to compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem properties.
In order to prove Theorem 60, recall the notion of partiallyK-reducible logic from
Definition 32.
Lemma 61. Let K be a class of models containing all models of cardinality at most
λ. Suppose a logic L is partially K-reducible to a compact logic L′ with lΣ = λ.
Then L is compact.
Proof. Let Φ be a finitely satisfiable set of L-sentences. Let Φ∗ be the set of
L′ -sentences that are the partial reductions of each sentence in Φ. Φ∗ is finitely
satisfiable, for take any finite set Σ∗ ⊂ Φ∗, and look at the corresponding set of
sentences Σ ⊂ Φ. By hypothesis, Σ has a model, and it is a model of each of the
sentences in Σ∗, so Φ∗ is finitely satisfiable. By compactness, it has a model, and
as the Löwenheim number for countable sets of sentences of L′ is λ, it has a model
M of that cardinality. AsM is a model with cardinality at most λ of each sentence
in Φ∗, it is a model of each sentence in Φ. 
Theorem 62. There is no maximal compact set logic.
Proof. Let L be a compact logic not necessarily closed under negation. Let λ be its
Löwenheim number. Add to L the class Kκ of models of the generalized quantifier
Q≤κx(x = x), whose interpretation is “there are at most κ elements", and close
under conjunction, disjunction, and existential and universal quantification. We
can find κ > λ such that Kκ /∈ L, because otherwise L would be a proper class.
Then L(Q≤κ) makes a proper extension of L. We prove L(Q≤κ) is compact. Let K
be the class of models of cardinality λ. Then L(Q≤κ) is partially K-reducible to L
by the sentence ∃x(x = x), and by Lemma 61 it is compact. 
The proof of the following theorem is a slight variation the proof of the same
theorem for logics with negation, given by Wacławek in [W78]. He uses L1 =
Lωω(Q1), where Q1 is the quantifier ”there exists uncountably many”, because in
this logic we can characterize countable models. But without negation this is not
the case, so we instead use Lωω(Q≤ℵ0), where Q≤ℵ0 is the quantifier “there exists
countably many”.
Theorem 63. There is no largest compact logic.
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Proof. The extension L1 of Lωω by Q≤ℵ0 , without negation, is compact. On the
other hand, let Qdcω be defined as Qdcω xyφ(x, y, ) iff φ defines a linear ordering with-
out Dedekind cuts of cofinality ω. From [Sh75] it follows that L2 = Lωω(Qdcω ) is
compact. Clearly, the ordering (ω,<) can be characterized in Lωω(Qdcω ) among
countable models. Hence, any common extension of L1 and L2 is not compact.
Wacławek proof ends here, but we have to make sure we do not need negation for
proving the statements related to Qdcω . First, Lωω(Qdcω ) without negation is compact
because is a sublogic of Lωω(Qdcω ) with negation. Finally, “the ordering (ω,<) can be
characterized in Lωω(Qdcω ) among countable models” is expressed by the conjunction
σ of the following sentences:
• “ < is a linear order with a first element and such that every element except
the first has an immediate successor and an immediate predecessor”,
• Q≤ℵ0x(x = x),
• Qdcω xy(x < y).
Clearly, only (ω,<) is a model of σ, and only the first sentence, which is a first order
sentence, uses negation. 
Theorem 64. There is no maximal set logic with respect to LS.
Proof. Let L be as above. Add to L the class Kκ of models of the generalized
quantifier Q≤κx(x = x), whose interpretation is “there are at most κ elements", and
close under conjunction, disjunction, and existential and universal quantification.
We can find κ > ω such that Kκ /∈ L, because otherwise L would be a proper class.
Then L(Q≤κ) makes a proper extension of L.
We show L(Q≤κ) has the Löwenheim-Skolem property. Let K be the class of
models of cardinality ℵ0. Then L(Q≤κ) is partiallyK-reducible to L by the sentence
∃x(x = x), and by Lemma 35, it has LS. 
From theorems 62 and 64, we conclude that there is no maximal compact set logic
with the Löwenheim-Skolem property. This covers the result for non-maximality of
countable logics without negation of last section.
Theorem 65 (Wacławek [W78]). There is no largest logic with respect to LS.
Sketch of Proof Let QB be defined by A |= QBxyφ(x, y) iff (A, {(a, b) : A |=
φ(a, b)) is an uncountable well ordering or a well ordering of the type of the set
B. Now construct two disjoint classes of well orderings QA0 , QA1 such that L(QAi)
have LS for i = 0, 1, but any common extension of both not necessarily closed under
negation do not have LS. 
The following theorem is the closest we get to our aim which was to find whether
there is a largest logic with respect to Compactness and LS(ℵ0).
Theorem 66. There is no largest logic with respect to Compactness and LS(ℵ1).
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Proof. Let Q1 and Q2 be two quantifiers such that Q1xF (x) says that |F | < ω or
|F | is a limit cardinal, andQ2xF (x) says that |F | < ω or |F | is a successor cardinal.
We prove that Lωω(Qi), i = 1, 2 are compact and LS(ℵ1). Since any common ex-
tension of both logics would be able to express F is finite, no such extension is
compact. It is easy to see that Qi, i = 1, 2 have LS(ℵ1). For Compactness, let T
be a countable finitely consistent theory in Lωω(Q1). Add to the vocabulary τ of T
a unary predicate symbol N , a binary relation symbol <, and a ternary relation
symbol R. For any sentence φ, let [Q1xφ(x)]∗ be the τ ∪ {R,N,<}-sentence that
says that there is x such that R(x, ., .) defines a 1-1 mapping from {y : φ∗(y)} into
{y ∈ N : y < z}, for some z ∈ N . Let T ∗ = {φ∗ : φ ∈ T} ∪ “ < is a linear order
of N . We show that T ∗ is finitely consistent in first order logic. Let S be a finite
sub-theory of T . By assumption, there is a modelM of S. Let |M| = κ. ExpandM
to a model M′ of S∗ by adding a well-order of type κ+ 1 and letting R map every
{y : φ∗(y)} to a respective initial segment of this well-order. By compactness and
LS of first-order logic, there is a countable model M′′ of T ∗. We get that M′′ is a
model of T because every Q1xF (x) is trivially true, as all subsets of M ′′ are either
finite or of cardinality ω, which is a limit cardinal.
We now show Q2 is compact. Let T be a countable finitely consistent theory
in Lωω(Q2). Add to the vocabulary τ of T a unary predicate symbol N , a binary
relation symbol <, and a ternary relation symbol R. For any sentence φ, let
[Q2xφ(x)]
∗ be the τ∪{R,N,<}-sentence that says that there is x such that R(x, ., .)
defines a 1-1 mapping from {y : φ∗(y)} into {y ∈ N : y < z}, for some z ∈ N . Let
T ∗ = {φ∗ : φ ∈ T} ∪ “ < is a linear order without a last element of N . We show
that T ∗ is finitely consistent in first order logic. Let S be a finite sub-theory of T .
By assumption, there is a model M of S. Let |M| = κ. Expand M to a model M′
of S∗ by adding a well-order of type κ + 1 and letting R map every {y : φ∗(y)} to
a respective initial segment of this well-order. By compactness we get a model M′′
of T ∗ of size ℵ1, such that every infinite initial segment of < is uncountable. We
get that M′′ is a model of T of size ℵ1 because if [Q2xφ(x)]∗ holds then φ∗ holds
finitely many x or for exactly ℵ1 many x. Hence Q2xφ(x) follows as ℵ1 is a successor
cardinal. 
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5.1. Dual Properties.
If we do not have negation, compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem properties split
into three non-equivalent forms (see Definition 14). We study here maximality with
respect to these properties.
Given a logic L, we always assume that Str[τ ], the class of all structures of
vocabulary τ , and K∅, the empty class of models, are definable classes in L. That
is, we can always assume that there is a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence.
This remark is not necessary when we talk about extensions of first order logic, that
is the majority of cases. Recall that n(K) denotes the class of countable models of
a class of models K.
Proposition 67. Let L be a logic. If L is ?-LS, then it is LS and DuLS. If further
we assume L is closed under negation, then the three properties are equivalent.
Proof. First we prove ?-LS is the strongest condition. ?-LS implies LS, since if
there is a class K with n(K) = ∅, then K = K∅ for otherwise K and K∅ would
be two different classes with the same countable models. Therefore, any nonempty
class has countable models. Now, ?-LS implies DuLS since, by the same argument
as in the previous case, if there is a class with n(K) = n(Str[τ ]), then K = Str[τ ].
For the converses, let L be closed under negation. First we prove that DuLS
implies LS. Suppose L does not satisfy LS. Then there is a nonempty class K
which does not have countable models. Then n(K) = n(Str[τ ]), but K 6= Str[τ ].
Finally, we prove that DuLS implies ?-LS. LetK1,K2 be such that n(K1) = n(K2)
but K1 6= K2. Suppose there is A such that A ∈ K2, but A /∈ K1. Then K1 ∪K2
contains all countable models, but it does not contain all models, since it does not
contain A. 
Closure under negation is necessary for the last part of the proof. For instance, we
can have L not closed under negation, e. g. PC(Lωω), such that there is φ ∈ L with
n(Mod(φ)) = n(Str[τ ]) and Mod(φ) 6= Str[τ ], that satisfies Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem. It is in principle only necessary that ¬φ /∈ L. Similarly, a logic L
can satisfy DuLS containing a non-empty class without countable models, like for
example cPC(Lωω). From these it follows that neither LS nor DuLS imply ?-LS.
Moreover, not even LS and DuLS together are able to make the logic closed under
negation. This is proved by the fact that there is a compact extension of first-order
logic with LS and DuLS, namely PC∩Lω1ω, a compact fragment of Lω1ω not closed
under negation.
Proposition 68. Let L be a logic. If L is ?-compact, then it is compact and dual
compact. If further we assume L is closed under negation, then the three properties
are equivalent.
Proof. ?-compactness implies compactness: Let Φ′ in Definition 14.1.b be incon-
sistent. ?-compactness implies dual-compactness: Let Φ be a set of valid sentences,
and suppose no finite subset Φ0 ⊆ Φ′ covers everything. Then, by ?-compactness,
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there is a model B that is not a model of any sentence in Φ′, therefore Φ′ does not
cover everything.
Now for the converse, suppose L is closed under negation. We prove first dual
compactness implies compactness: Suppose L is not compact. Let Φ be a countable
set of classes with empty intersection. Assume Φ can cover Str[τ ] (we can assume
this since we can always add Str[τ ] to Φ). Then, any finite subset Φ0 of Φ has
nonempty intersection. Now consider the set Φ := {¬φ : φ ∈ Φ}. Then ⋃Φ =
Str[τ ], and
⋂
Φ = ∅ too, but there is no Ψ0 ⊆ Φ that covers Str[τ ], otherwise⋂
Ψ0 =
⋂{¬ψ : ψ ∈ Ψ0} = ∅, contradicting the assumption that L is not compact.
Finally, we prove compactness implies ?-compactness: Suppose L is compact, and
let Φ,Φ′ be two countable sets of sentences such that for every finite Φ0 ⊆ Φ and
every finite Φ′0 ⊆ Φ′, there is a model A such that A |=
∧
Φ0 and A 6|=
∨
Φ′0. Then
A |= ∧ Φ˜′0. Clearly Φ∪Φ˜′ is finitely satisfiable, and by compactness there is a model
B such that B |= Φ ∪ Φ˜′. Hence B |= ∧Φ and B |= ∧ Φ˜′, i.e. B 6|= ∨Φ′. 
Definition 69. We say that L is partially K-dual reducible to L′, if for any φ ∈ L
there is φ∗ ∈ L′ such that φ∗ → φ in all models, and the converse is true in models
in K.
Definition 70. The dual Löwenheim number of L, in symbols dl(L), is the least
κ such that any sentence φ ∈ L valid in all models of size at most κ is valid. The
dual Löwenheim number of L for countable sets of sentences, in symbols dlΣ(L), is
the least κ such that for any countable Φ, if Mod(Φ) = Str[τ ], then there is Φ0 ⊆ Φ
such that Mod(Φ0) = Str[τ ].
Note that in set logics both numbers clearly exist.
Lemma 71. Let K be a class of models that contains all models of cardinality at
most λ. If L is partially K-reducible to a dual compact logic L′ with dlΣ = λ, then
L is dual compact.
Proof. Let Φ ⊂ L be a countable set of sentences whose classes of models cover
everything. Then the set Φ∗ ⊆ L′ of partial reductions of every sentence in Φ covers
all models of cardinality at most λ, and by dlΣ of L′, it covers everything. By dual
compactness of L′, there is a finite Φ∗0 ⊂ Φ∗ that covers everything. Let Φ0 be the
finite set of sentences in Φ whose reductions are in Φ∗0. Clearly Φ0 covers everything.

Theorem 72. There is no maximal set logic with the dual compactness property.
Proof. Let L be a dual compact logic with dlΣ = λ. Add the class Kκ of models of
the sentence Q≥κx(x = x), whose interpretation is "there are at least κ elements",
and close under conjunction, disjunction, and existential and universal quantifica-
tion. We can find κ > λ such that Kκ /∈ L, because otherwise L would be a proper
class. Then L(Q≥κ) makes a proper extension of L. We show L(Q≥κ) is dual com-
pact. Let K be the class of models of cardinality ≤ λ. Then L(Q≥κ) is partially
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K-reducible to L by the sentence ∃x(x 6= x), and by Lemma 71 it is dual compact.

Lemma 73. Let K be a class containing all countable models. If a logic L is
partially K-dual reducible to a dual LS logic L′, then L is dual LS.
Proof. Let φ ∈ L be a sentence valid in all countable models. By assumption, there
is φ∗ ∈ L′ such that φ → φ∗ in models in K. Clearly, φ∗ is valid in models in K,
and by dual LS it is valid. Now φ∗ → φ, and therefore φ is valid. 
Proposition 74. There is no maximal set logic with respect to the dual Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem.
Proof. Let L be a set logic with DuLS. Add to L the class of models of the
generalized quantifierQ≥κx(x = x) whose interpretation is “there are at least κmany
elements in the universe”, and close under conjunction, disjunction, and existential
and universal quantification. We show L(Q≥κ) is partially K-dual reducible to L.
Let K be the class of countable models. Then L(Q≥κ) is partially K-dual reducible
to L by the sentence ∃x(x 6= x), and by Lemma 73 it has dual LS. 
Proposition 75. There is a maximal set logic with ?-LS property.
Proof. This proof is the same as proof of Theorem 57. 
Next theorems are the natural application of dual properties. We prove a failure
of separation and establish a reduction theorem.
Lemma 76. There are two cPC(Lωω)-classes that cannot be separated by any first-
order class.
Proof. LetK1 be the class of models such that 〈A,<〉 /∈ K1 ↔ A is infinite or ∃X ⊆
A such that X has the first element, the last element, and every second element;
and letK2 be the class of models such that 〈A,<〉 /∈ K2 ↔ A is infinite or ∃X ⊆ A
such that X has the first element, every second element, but not the last element.
K1 and K2 cannot be separated by any first-order sentence because (2n+1, <) ≡n
(2n+1 + 1, <). 
Theorem 77 (Reduction Property). Let L be a logic extending Lωω, not necessarily
closed under negation, dual compact and duLS. If K1 and K2 are two Lωω-classes
such that K1∪K2 = Str[τ ], then there is K in Lωω such that K ⊆ K1 and K ⊆ K2.
Proof. Let L∗ = {K : K ∈ L}. We prove that L∗ extends Lωω and is compact
and LS. That L∗ extends Lωω is clear since L is assumed to extend it, and Lωω
is closed under negation -so all Lωω is in L∗. Now we prove L∗ is compact. So let
Φ¯ = {K : K ∈ Φ}, and suppose L∗ is not compact. Then there is a countable Φ
with empty intersection, such that for every finite Φ0 ⊂ Φ we have
⋂
Φ0 6= ∅. But
that means that
⋃
Φ¯0 6= Str[τ ] for all finite Φ¯0 ⊂ Φ¯, while
⋃
Φ¯ = Str[τ ], hence
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L is not dual compact, a contradiction. Now suppose L∗ is not LS. Then there is
a nonempty model class K ∈ L∗ without countable models. But then K ∈ L has
all countable models but not all models, and L is not duLS, a contradiction. Now,
by Theorem 42, there is K ∈ Lωω that separates K1 and K2. It is easy to see that
K ∈ Lωω is as we wanted. 
The above Reduction Property is like the Separation Property (Theorem 42), a
negation-free formulation of Lindström’s Theorem. It shows that in a dual LS and
dual compact extension of first order logic only the first order sentences can have a
negation.
6. Extensions by monotone quantifiers
In this section, we study extensions of Lωω with monadic monotone quantifiers,
not closed under negation. We are interested in compactness and interpolation
aspects of those logics.
Our first result tries to characterize these quantifiers in terms of cardinal quan-
tifiers, so that it is possible to make the study of compactness and interpolation is
terms of the latter.
Definition 78. Let σ = {U}, U a unary predicate, and let Q be a unary quantifier.
Let Q(A) = {X ⊆ A : (A,X) |= QyU(y)}. We call Q upwards monotone, if
X ∈ Q(A) and X ⊂ Y ⊂ A imply Y ∈ Q(A).
Q is downwards monotone, if
X ∈ Q(A) and Y ⊂ X ⊂ A imply Y ∈ Q(A).
Recall from the examples following Definition 4 that a monadic cardinality quan-
tifier Qα is associated with the class K = {(A,C) : C ⊆ A, |C| ≥ ℵα}. Since we
are interested in extensions not closed under negation, in our framework a cardinal
quantifier splits into four, Q+α , Q−α , Q˜+α , and Q˜−α whose interpretations are:
A |= Q+αxφ(x) iff |{a ∈ A : A |= φ(a¯, a)}| ≥ ℵα,
A |= Q−αxφ(x) iff |{a ∈ A : A 6|= φ(a¯, a)}| < ℵα.
A |= Q˜+αxφ(x) iff |{a ∈ A : A |= φ(a¯, a)}| < ℵα,
A |= Q˜−αxφ(x) iff |{a ∈ A : A 6|= φ(a¯, a)}| ≥ ℵα.
Clearly, Q+α and Q−α are upwards monotone, and Q˜+α and Q˜−α are downwards
monotone.
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We define a weak negation in Lωω(Q+α , Q−β ) as:
∼φ = ¬φ if φ atomic
∼φ = ψ if φ negated atomic ¬ψ
∼(φ ∧ ψ) = ∼φ∨ ∼ψ
∼(φ ∨ ψ) = ∼φ∧ ∼ψ
∼∃xφ = ∀x ∼φ
∼∀xφ = ∃x ∼φ
∼Q+αxφ = Q−β x ∼φ
∼Q−β xφ = Q+αx ∼φ
Note that we get closure under negation if α = β.
Upwards and downwards monotone quantifiers have different back-and-forth sys-
tems.
Definition 79 (Back-and-forth systems). Let τ be a vocabulary not containing S.
Let A,B be τ -structures, 0 ≤ γ ≤ ω, and I = (Iδ)δ≤γ a sequence of subsets of
Part(A,B). We say that I has the ∃-back-and-forth property if it satisfies conditions
(i)− (iv) of Definition 11.
We say that I has the Q-forth property iff for all m < γ, p ∈ Im+1, and X ⊂
A,X ∈ Q(A), there is Y ⊂ B, Y ∈ Q(B) such that for all d ∈ Y there is q ∈ Im
such that p ⊆ q, d ∈ rg(q) and q−1(d) ∈ X.
Two structures A,B are γ,Q-isomorphic via I, written I : A ∼=γ,Q iff I = (Iδ)δ≤γ
is a sequence of length γ + 1 of nonempty subsets of Part(A,B) having the ∃-back-
and-forth, and the Q-forth properties. Two structures are γ,Q-isomorphic, written
A ∼=γ,Q iff there is I such that I : A ∼=γ,Q B.
Lemma 80. Let Q be an upwards monotone quantifier. Let L∗ denote the logic
Lωω(Q). If A ∼=n,Q B, then A ≤nL∗ B.
Proof. By induction on the quantifier rank. The quantifier rank is defined as always.
For the case of Q, qr(Qxφ) = qr(φ) + 1. Let the claim be proved for qr(φ) ≤ m.
Let I : A ∼=m,Q B be given. Let p ∈ Im+1, and a0, . . . , ak−1 ∈ dom(p) be given, and
assume ψ = Qxφ(a¯, x), qr(φ) ≤ m. Suppose A |= Qxφ(a¯, x). Then
X = {c ∈ A : A |= φ(a¯, c)} ∈ Q(A).
By the Q-forth property there is Y ⊆ B, Y ∈ Q(B), such that ∀d ∈ Y,∃q ∈ Im with
q−1(d) ∈ X. We show Y ⊆ {b ∈ B : B |= φ(p(a¯), b)}. Let d ∈ Y . Choose q so that
q−1(d) ∈ X. Then A |= φ(a¯, q−1(d)), and by induction hypothesis B |= φ(p(a¯), d),
so we get d ∈ {b ∈ B : B |= φ(p(a¯), b)} and the claim is proved. Since Q is upwards
monotone and Y ∈ Q(B), by the claim {b ∈ B : B |= φ(p(a¯), b)} ∈ Q(B) too, and
hence B |= Qxφ(p(a¯), x). 
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For proving the converse of the Lemma 80, we need the following
Definition 81. Let a¯ ∈ Ak, consider the following formulas:
φ0a¯ =
∧
{φ(x¯) : φ atomic or negated atomic ,A |= φ(x¯)};
φm+1a¯ =
∧
c∈A
∃yφma¯,c(x¯, y) ∧ ∀y
∨
c∈A
φma¯,c(x¯, y)
∧
∧
M∈Q(A)
Qy
∨
c∈M
φma¯,c(x¯, y).
Lemma 82. Let τ be a finite vocabulary and Q a monotone quantifier. For each
n, k ∈ N, and every set of variables {x0, x1, . . . , xk−1}, there are only finitely many
non-equivalent formulas of the form φnx¯, and they are all in Lωω(Q).
Proof. By induction on the quantifier rank of the formulas. It is clear for n = 0, for
we have finitely many atomic and negated atomic formulas, since the vocabulary is
finite. Suppose we have proved the claim for n = m. We prove it for n = m+1. Now,
we prove there are finitely many formulas of the form ∃yφma¯,c(x¯, y). By induction
hypothesis, there are finitely many nonequivalent formulas of the form φma¯a, so we
can choose finitely many c ∈ A, one for each of them. For the case of Q, we need to
consider only finitely many models M . As there are only finitely many ci, we just
need to find at most one M for each ci. 
Lemma 83. If A ≤nLω,ω(Q) B, then A ∼=n,Q B.
Proof. We check the Q-forth condition. Assume A ≤nLω,ω(Q) B, and define
Im = {p ∈ Part(A,B)|dom(p) = {a0, . . . , ak−1} and B |= φma¯ (p(a¯))}
Suppose we have X ⊆ A,X ∈ Q(A). Then we have to prove that we can find
Y ⊆ B, Y ∈ Q(B), and for all y ∈ Y there is x ∈ X and q ⊃ p such that q(x) = y.
So let c0, . . . , cm ∈ X, be such that
X ⊆
m⋃
i=0
{c ∈ A|A |= φma¯,c(a¯, ci)}.
Then, A |= Qα,βx
∨m
i=0 φ
m
a¯,c(a¯), x), and since qr(φ) ≤ m, we get, by induction
hypothesis B |= Qα,βx
∨m
i=0 φ
m
a¯,ci
(p(a¯), x). Let
Y =
m⋃
i=0
{d ∈ B|B |= φma¯,ci(p(a¯), d)}.
Then clearly Y ∈ Q(B), and from the definition of Im, for all y ∈ Y there is
x ∈ X and q ⊃ p such that q(x) = y. 
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6.1. Model theoretic characterization.
In this section we prove that any upwards monotone quantifier Q is equivalent to
either Q+α or Q−α in models of cardinality ≥ ℵα for some α. The proof is made along
the same lines as Flum’s in [Fl85]. The crucial matter that makes his proof works
in this context is having at hand a back-and-forth system as defined in the previous
section. However, not having negation poses some limitations. Flum is able to
say how the quantifier Q+α looks like for models of cardinality equal or bigger than
ℵα and for models of cardinality smaller than ℵα. We do not seem to have such
possibility.
Let Q be an upwards monotone quantifier. Associate with Q a function gQ defined
on the class of non-zero cardinals which maps each cardinal λ into a pair of cardinals
g(λ) = (µ, ν), where for any set A with |A| = λ,
gQ(λ) = (λ, 0) if Q(A) = ∅,
and otherwise,
µ = min{|X| : X ∈ Q(A)}, and ν = sup{|A\X|+ : X ∈ Q(A)}.
Note that for infinite λ, we always have µ = λ or ν = λ+. For the specific case of
cardinality quantifiers, we have
gQ
+
α (λ) =
{
(λ, 0) λ < ℵα
(ℵα, λ+) λ ≥ ℵα
}
and
gQ
−
α (λ) =
{
(0, λ+) λ < ℵα
(λ,ℵα) λ ≥ ℵα
}
The following theorem is a negation-free version of Theorem 4.1 in [Fl85].
Theorem 84. Suppose Lωω(Q) is a relativizing logic properly extending first-order
logic with a monotone quantifier. Assume Lωω(Qd) is also relativizing. Then there
is α such that for models of cardinality equal to or bigger that ℵα, Q is either Q+α
or Q−α .
Proof. Denote gQ by g. We establish the theorem by showing that g(λ) = gQ
+
α (λ)
or g = gQ
−
α (λ) from some cardinality λ0 = ℵα onwards. For that, we prove the
following claims:
(i) For λ < µ, if g(λ) 6= (λ, 0), then g(µ) 6= (µ, 0).
Let Λ = {λ : g(λ) = (µ, ν) and µ, ν ≥ ω}, and if Λ 6= ∅ let λ0 = inf Λ.
(ii) g(λ0) = (λ0, λ+0 ) ∨ g(λ0) = (λ0, λ0).
(iii) If g(λ0) = (λ0, λ+0 ), then for λ ≥ λ0, g(λ) = (λ0, λ+).
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Suppose there is no λ0 such that µ, ν in g(λ0) = (µ, ν) are both infinite. In that
case, we prove
(iv) Suppose λ ≥ ω and n ∈ ω.
(a) If g(λ) = (λ, n), then there is m0 ∈ ω such that for all m ≥ m0
g(m) = (m− n+ 1, n).
(b) If g(λ) = (n, λ+), then there is m0 ∈ ω such that for all m ≥ m0
g(m) = (n,m− n+ 1).
And hence Q or Qd is equal to ∃≥n.
For example, let Q be an upwards monotone quantifier. By (ii), choose gQ(λ0) =
(λ0, λ
+
0 ). By (iii), for all λ ≥ λ0, g(λ) = (λ0, λ+). Thus for λ0 = ℵα, we have gQ(λ)
is equal to gQ
+
α (λ) from some λ onwards. In case gQ(λ0) = (λ0, λ0), then we have to
use the dual Qd. In this case gQd(λ0) = (λ0, λ+0 ), and we proceed as we just saw in
the previous case, getting gQ(λ) equal to gQ
−
α (λ) from some λ onwards.
Proof of (i). Let g(λ) 6= (λ, 0) and g(µ) = (µ, 0) for some µ > λ. Let B,B′
be two sets of cardinality µ. Let A ⊂ B, |A| = λ. Then 〈B,A,A〉 |= [QxP (x)]A,
since g(λ) 6= (λ, 0). Let A′ ⊂ B′ and |A′| = µ, |B′ \ A′| = µ. If we can prove
〈B,A,A〉 ≤L(Q) 〈B′, A′, A′〉, we will get 〈B′, A′, A′〉 |= [QxP ′(x)]A′ , contradicting
g(µ) = (µ, 0). Now, the game cannot start with a choice of a subset X ∈ Q(B),
since |B| = µ and by assumption Q(B) = ∅. Then the game restricts to first order
moves, and hence 〈B′, A′, A′〉 |= [QxP ′(x)]A′ .
Proof of (ii). First we prove that the first component of g(λ0) must be λ0. So
suppose g(λ0) = (µ, λ+0 ), µ < λ0. By definition of λ0, µ ≥ ω. Let B,B′ be two sets
of cardinality λ0. Let A ⊂ B, |A| = λ0, |B \A| = λ0, and P ⊂ A, |P | = µ -see Figure
1. Then 〈B,A, P 〉 |= [QxP (x)]A, since g(λ0) = (µ, λ+0 ). Let A′ ⊂ B′, |A′| = µ, and
P ′ ⊂ A′, |P ′| = µ, |A′ \ P ′| = µ. If we can prove that
(?) 〈B,A, P 〉 ≤L(Q) 〈B′, A′, P ′〉,
we will get 〈B′, A′, P ′〉 |= [QxP ′(x)]A′ , hence contradicting the minimality of λ0.
Proof of (?). Let I be the set of finite partial isomorphisms between 〈B,A, P 〉
and 〈B′, A′, P ′〉, p = {(a0, b0), (a1, b1), . . . , (am−1, bm−1)} ∈ I, ai ∈ B, bi ∈ B′, and
let X ∈ Q(B). Choose Y ⊆ B′, as described below, such that |X| = |Y |, |X| = |Y |.
For a monotone quantifier Q, the fact that a subset X ⊆ A is in Q(A) depends only
on |A|, |X|, and |A \ X|, hence Y ∈ Q(B′) follows immediately from X ∈ Q(B).
Now, there are two general cases for the election of Y :
(1) First suppose -see Figure 2- that X ⊂ P , then take Y ⊂ P ′, and be sure
that for every ai if ai ∈ X, then bi = p(ai) ∈ Y . Since |X| = |Y |, any choice
of y ∈ Y can be replied with x ∈ X.
(2) Now suppose -see Figure 3- X ⊂ A, but there is an x ∈ P such that x /∈
X. Then take Y of the same form and such that for every ai ∈ X, the
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Figure 1
Figure 2
corresponding bi ∈ Y . Since there have been a finite number of choices, and
|A \ P | is infinite, any choice in Y can be replied in X.
(3) The other cases for choosing Y are similar.
Now, we prove the second component is either λ0 or λ+0 . Let µ+ < λ0 and assume
g(λ0) = (λ0, µ
+). Let B,B′ be two sets of cardinality λ0. Let A ⊂ B, |A| = λ0,
and |B \ A| = λ0; and P ⊂ A, |P | = λ0, such that |A \ P | = µ. Then 〈B,A, P 〉 |=
[QxP (x)]A. Let A′ ⊂ B′, |A′| = µ, and P ′ ⊂ A′, |P ′| = µ, such that |A′ \ P ′| = µ
-see Figure 4. If we can prove
(??) 〈B,A, P 〉 ≤L(Q) 〈B′, A′, P ′〉,
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Figure 3
we will get 〈B′, A′, P ′〉 |= [QxP ′(x)]A′ , contradicting the minimality of λ0. The
procedure is the same in case g(λ0) = (λ0, µ), and µ is a limit cardinal. The proof
of (??) works in the same way as the proof of (?).
Figure 4
Proof of (iii). Let g(λ0) = (λ0, λ+0 ). First we prove that in a set A of size λ > λ0
Q(A) contains subsets of size λ0. So consider two sets B,B′ of cardinality λ. Let
A ⊂ B of cardinality λ0, and P ⊂ A of cardinality λ0, such that |A \P | = λ0. Since
g(λ0) = (λ0, λ
+
0 ), it means that 〈B,A, P 〉 |= [QxP (X)]A. Let A′ ⊂ B′ of cardinality
λ, |B′ \ A′| = λ, and P ′ ⊂ A′ of cardinality λ0 -see figure 5. If we can prove that
(? ? ?) 〈B,A, P 〉 ≤L(Q) 〈B′, A′, P ′〉,
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then we will get 〈B′, A′, P ′〉 |= [QxP ′(X)]A′ , demonstrating that Q(A′) contains a
set of size λ0.
Figure 5
Again, (? ? ?) is proved like (?). In the same way as in (ii), we can prove that
Q(A) does not contain subsets of size less than λ0.
Proof of (iv). (a). We show if g(λ) = (λ, n), there is m0 ∈ ω such that for
all finite m ≥ m0, g(m) = (m − n + 1, n). Let k be the quantifier rank of the
sentence [QxP (x)]A. Suppose that m ≥ k, g(λ) = (λ, n), λ ≥ ω, n ∈ ω, but g(m) =
(m − l + 1, l),m > n, l > n, n ∈ ω. Let B,B′ be two sets of cardinality λ. Let
A ⊂ B, |A| = m, and P ⊂ A, |A \ P | = l − 1 -see Figure 6. Then 〈B,A, P 〉 |=
[QxP (x)]A. Let A′ ⊂ B′, |A′| = λ, and P ′ ⊂ A′, |A′ \ P ′| = l − 1. If we can prove
(4?) : 〈B,A, P 〉 ≤L(Q)k 〈B′, A′, P ′〉, we will get 〈B′, A′, P ′〉 |= [QxP ′(x)]A′ , hence
contradicting the maximality of n. The proof of (4?) is based in the same argument
as the proof of (?).
Figure 6
ABSTRACT MODEL THEORY WITHOUT NEGATION 45
(b). We show if g(λ) = (n, λ+), then there is m0 ∈ ω such that for all m ≥ m0,
g(m) = (n,m−n+1). Let again k be the quantifier rank of the sentence [QxP (x)]A.
So suppose m ≥ k, g(λ) = (n, λ+), λ ≥ ω, n ∈ ω, and g(m) = (l,m − l + 1),m >
n, l < n, n ∈ ω. Let B,B′ be two sets of cardinality λ. Let A ⊂ B, |A| = m,
and P ⊂ A, |P | = l -see Figure 7. Then 〈B,A, P 〉 |= [QxP (x)]A, since g(m) =
Figure 7
(l,m− l + 1). Let A′ ⊂ B′, |A′| = λ, and P ′ ⊂ A′, |P ′| = l. If we can prove that
(5?) 〈B,A, P 〉 ≤L(Q)k 〈B′, A′, P ′〉,
we will get 〈B′, A′, P ′〉 |= [QxP ′(x)]A′ , hence contradicting the minimality of n, in
view of g(λ) = (n, λ+).
Again, the proof of (5?) is based in the same argument as the proof of (?). 
Proposition 85. Let Q be an upwards monotone quantifier such that Lωω(Q) and
Lωω(Qd) relativize and have Löwenheim number κ. Then α in Theorem 84 is such
that κ = ℵα.
Proof. If Q is as in the hypothesis, then Theorem 84 gives us an α such that if we
restrict Lωω(Q) to models of size ≥ ℵα,
(11) Lωω(Q) ≡ Lωω(Q+α ) or Lωω(Q) ≡ Lωω(Q−α ).
Now, because of the Löwenheim number of Lωω(Q), we know in every nonempty
model class in Lωω(Q) there is a model of size ≤ κ, and because of (11), κ ≥ ℵα,
since Lωω(Q+α ) has LS(ℵα). To prove that κ = ℵα, suppose κ > ℵα. Now that
contradicts the Löwenheim-Skolem property of Lωω(Q+α ). 
The above analysis of L(Q) for Q upwards monotone, can be extended to exten-
sions of first order logic by a finite number of upwards monotone quantifiers. This
analysis will be pursued in another paper.
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6.2. Compactness.
In this section we explore the conditions on α, β for Lωω(Q+α , Q−β ) to satisfy com-
pactness. The case for an arbitrary number of quantifiers turns out to be very
complicated. We follow the works of Shelah [Sh71] and Fuhrken [F69].
The main result of the section is Theorem 102, that says Lωω(Q+α , Q−β ) is compact
if α < β, or if β ≤ α and: 1.) ℵγ = ℵℵ0γ , β = γ + 1, or 2.) ℵ0 is small for ℵβ, β a
limit ordinal. We first study the case when β is a successor ordinal, and then the
case when it is a limit ordinal.
Definition 86. Let λ ≥ µ, ν, be infinite cardinals. A (λ, µ, ν)-model is a model of
cardinality λ in which two distinguished predicates P,Q are interpreted as a set of
at least µ elements and a set of at most ν elements respectively.
We first look at the case µ ≤ ν.
Proposition 87. Let λ = µ ≤ ν. Let T be a first-order theory in a vocabulary
τ, |τ | ≤ µ, such that every finite T0 ⊂ T has a (λ, µ, ν)-model. Then T has a
(λ, µ, ν)-model.
Proof. Add to τ µ-many constants and let S = {P (ci) : i < µ}. By assumption
T ∪ S is finitely satisfiable, and by compactness T ∪ S is satisfiable, and hence
has a model in which |P | ≥ µ. By Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, T has a model
of cardinality λ = µ ≤ ν in which |P | is still of cardinality ≥ µ, and in which
obviously |Q| ≤ ν. 
Now we turn to the case in which µ > ν. In here we can adapt Shelah’s method
in [Sh71]. Let T be a theory in a vocabulary τ , and let A = {ai : i < λ} be a set of
λ new individual constants. Consider the following condition (∗) on T :
(∗) “Let ν = ν1 + 1. There is an equivalence relation E on
⋃
n∈ω A
n, with ν1
equivalence classes, such that equivalent sequences are of the same length and the
following sentences are consistent with T :
(i) ai 6= aj, where i 6= j for ν1 ≤ i < j < µ;
(ii) P (ai), where ν1 ≤ i < µ
(iii) Q(ai), where i < ν1;
(iv) τ(b¯) = τ(c¯)∨ (¬Q(τ(b¯))∧¬Q(τ(c¯))), where, for some n, τ is an n-place term
of τ , b¯, c¯ ∈ An, and b¯Ec¯.”
Lemma 88. Let λ > µ > ν, be as above. Let T be a first-order theory in a
vocabulary τ , such that |T | ≤ ν1, T has names for Skolem functions and T satisfies
(∗). Then T has a (λ, µ, ν)-model.
Proof. We can consider the vocabulary σ of T , to be of cardinality ≤ ν1. By (∗),
there is a model M in the language σ′ = σ ∪ A that satisfies (i) − (iv) above. By
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LS, we can assume M be of cardinality λ. To simplify notation, we can identify
each ai with the element of M that is denoted by it, and thus we have A ⊂M .
Let N be the elementary submodel of M, such that N is the union of A and the
set of elements of the form τMσ(b1, . . . , bn),10 where b1, . . . bn ∈ A. Since there are
λ finite strings b1, . . . bn in A, and there are at most ν1 (M  σ)-terms, there are
λ + λ ∗ ν1 = λ elements in N . Since in A we already have at least µ elements in
P , we are certain |PN| ≥ µ. We only have to prove that |QN| ≤ ν1. Now, QN
consists of all ai, i < ν1, as well as the elements of the form τMσ(b1, . . . , bn) which
are in QM. But the sentences in (iv) imply that for every term τ , and each n, each
equivalence class contributes at most once to elements in QN. Since there are ν1
M  σ-terms, each equivalence class contributes with ν1 elements to Q, and since
there are ν1 equivalence classes, we get |QN| = ν1. Hence, N  σ is a (λ, µ, ν)-model
of T . 
Lemma 89. Let µ > ν. Let T be a first-order theory. If T has a (λ, µ, ν)-model,
ν1 = ν
ℵ0
1 , and |T | ≤ ℵ0, then T satisfies (∗).
Proof. LetM be a (λ, µ, ν)-model of T . Expand τ(M) with the set of new constants
A, and interpret the ai so that they are the names of all the elements of M and
so that ai, i < ν1 are the names of all the elements of QM, and ai, ν1 < i < µ are
all the elements of PM. So we have M = A,QM = {ai : i < ν1} and PM = {ai :
ν1 < i < µ}. Let M′ =M  (L(T )
⋃
A). It is obvious that M′ is a model of T and
that (i)− (iii) hold in it. Now define an equivalence relation E by: For any pair of
n-tuples b¯, c¯ of A, b¯Ec¯ if, for every n-placeM′-term τ , either τ(b¯) = τ(c¯) or both are
not in QM′ . It is obvious that (iv) holds, and it remains to show that there are ν1
equivalence classes. It is only necessary to check this for terms in L(T ), since for the
constants in A, the requirement holds. So let Trmn be the set of all n-place terms
of τ(T ). For every b¯ ∈ An, let fb¯ be the function from Trmn to {ai : i < ν1} ∪ {e}
(where e is a new individual) defined as follows:
fb¯(τ) = ai if τ(b¯) = ai and i < ν1
fb¯(τ) = e otherwise.
Clearly b¯Ec¯ iff fb¯ = fc¯. Hence, since the number of such functions is ν
ℵ0
1 , there
are at most νℵ01 = ν1 equivalence classes. On the other hand, each ai, i < ν1 forms
an equivalence class for the term v, where v is an individual variable. Hence, there
are at least ν1 equivalence classes and the lemma follows. 
10Given a model A of vocabulary σ and set of elements S ⊆ A, an A-term of σ over S, denoted
as τA(s1, . . . , sn), s¯ ⊆ S is defined as follows:
(1) Given an assignment pi, a variable x whose image under pi, pi(x) = s for some s ∈ S, is an
A-term of σ over S.
(2) Every constant c ∈ σ whose interpretation σA = s for some s ∈ S, is an A-term of σ over
S.
(3) If n > 0, f is and n-ary function symbol in σ, nad τ1, . . . , τn are A-terms of σ over S,
then f(τ1, . . . , τn) is an A-term of σ over S.
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Lemma 90. If ν1 = νℵ01 , T first-order and at most countable, and every finite
subtheory of T satisfies (∗), so does T .
Proof. Clearly T is consistent with (i), (ii). Let T = {φ0, φ1, . . . }, and let Ei be
equivalence relations such that (i)− (iv) are consistent with φ0 ∧ · · · ∧ φi. Let E be
defined as:
b¯Ec¯ if, for every i < ω, b¯Eic¯.
Then clearly T is consistent with (iii). Now, each Ei has ν1 equivalence classes, and
if we superpose the grids of each Ei, since there are ℵ0 of them, we could get at most
νℵ01 = ν1 equivalent classes, that is, in case no Ei has an equivalence class equal to
some equivalence class in some Ej. And we could get at least ν1 equivalence classes,
that is, in case all Ei provide the same equivalence classes. 
Lemma 91. A first-order theory T satisfies (∗) iff every countable subtheory of T
satisfies (∗).
Proof. This proof is exactly the same as Shelah’s in [Sh71], only modifying that
the permutations on the relation symbols keep fixed also P .
The above lemmas prove the following
Proposition 92. Let µ > ν. If every finite subtheory of a first-order theory T , with
|T | ≤ ν1 = νℵ01 has a (λ, µ, ν)-model, then T has a (λ, µ, ν)-model.
We now adapt Fuhrken’s method in [F69] for translating an Lωω(Q+α , Q−β )-theory
into a first order one, and then be ready to apply Proposition 92 to it.
Let τ be a vocabulary, and U, V, F1, F2 be respectively two unary and two ternary
predicates not in τ . Let L∗ωω = Lωω[τ ∪ {U, V, F1, F2}].
For any formula ϕ ∈ Lωω[τ ](Q+α , Q−β ) define ϕ∗ ∈ L∗ωω:
(1) ϕ∗ = ϕ if ϕ is atomic.
(2) (¬ϕ)∗ = ¬ϕ∗ if ϕ ∈ Lωω[τ ]
(3) (ϕ ∧ ψ)∗ = ϕ∗ ∧ ψ∗
(4) (∃xϕ(x))∗ = ∃xϕ∗(x)
(5) (Q+αvnϕ(vn))∗ = ∃vk∀vk+1∃vn(U(vk+1)→ (ϕ∗(vn) ∧ F1(vk, vk+1, vn)))
(6) (Q−β vnϕ(vn))
∗ = ∃vk∀vk+1∃vn(V (vk+1) ∨ (ϕ∗(vn) ∧ F2(vk, vk+1, vn))).
We associate with any set Σ ⊆ Lωω(Q+α , Q−β )[τ ] a set Σ∗ ⊆ L∗ωω which consists of
the following sentences:
(a) All the sentences σ∗, for σ ∈ Σ
(b) The sentence which says “F1, F2 are indexed collections of one-to-one func-
tions”.
Lemma 93. A structure A of cardinality λ is a model of Σ iff there are subsets
X, Y , such that |X| ≥ ℵα, |Y | < ℵβ, and some ternary relations Z1, Z2 on A such
that 〈A, X, Y, Z1, Z2〉 is a model of Σ∗.
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Proof. Suppose first that A is a model of Σ. LetX, Y be subsets of A of cardinalities
ℵα,ℵγ respectively. Let A (resp. B) be the set of all subsets S1 (resp. S2) of A such
that for some subformula Q+αxψ(a¯, x) (resp. Q
−
β xθ(a¯, x)) of a sentence of Σ true in
A,
S1 = {a ∈ A : A |= ψ(a¯, a)}
respectively
S2 = {a ∈ A : A |= θ(a¯, a)}.
For every S1 ∈ A, let h1 be a function that maps one-to-one the elements of X
into the elements of S1, so h1 : X → S1. Let H1 = {h1 : S1 ∈ A}
For every S2 ∈ B, let h2 be a function that maps one-to-one the elements of Y
into the elements of S2, so h2 : Y → S2. Let H2 = {h2 : S2 ∈ B}.
The sets A,B are composed of subsets of A definable by formulas of the above
form with parameters. So |A|, |B| ≤ |A|, and therefore |H1|, |H2| ≤ |A|, and we can
index both sets by one-to-one functions fi : Hi → A.
Let Z1, Z2 be ternary relations defined on A by
< x, y, x >∈ Z1 iff for some h1 ∈ H1, f1(h1) = x and h1(y) = z
and
< x, y, x >∈ Z2 iff for some h2 ∈ H2, f2(h2) = x and h2(y) = z.
Clearly A+ = 〈A, X, Y, Z1, Z2〉 is a model of the sentences in (b). Now we have to
prove that it is a model of the sentences σ∗ ∈ Σ∗, for σ ∈ Σ. We prove by induction
on the formation of formulas that
(?) A |= ϕ→ A+ |= ϕ∗.
The only interesting cases are those with the generalized quantifier.
So suppose a¯ ∈ A, and A |= Q+αvnϕ(a¯, vn). Let S1 ∈ H1 be
S1 = {a ∈ A : A |= ϕ(a¯, a)},
Then |S1| ≥ α, and there is a function h1 : X → S1. Let f1(h1) = b. Then,
for all c ∈ X, there is some a ∈ S1 such that < b, c, a >∈ Z1. So 〈A, X, Z1〉 |=
∃vk∀vk+1∃vnF1(vk, vk+1, vn). Now, by induction hypothesis, we have for all a ∈ S1
that A+ |= ϕ∗(a¯, a). It follows that
A+ |= ∃vk∀vk+1∃vn(U(vk+1)→ (ϕ∗(a¯, vn) ∧ F1(vk, vk+1, vn)))
that is
A+ |= (Q+αvnϕ(a¯, vn))∗.
Now let A |= Q−β vnϕ(a¯, vn). Let
S2 = {a ∈ A : A |= ϕ(a¯, a)},
Then |S¯2| < ℵβ, and there is a function h2 : Y¯ → S2. Let f2(h2) = b. Then,
for all a ∈ Y , there is some c ∈ S2 such that < b, a, c >∈ Z2. So 〈A, Y, Z2〉 |=
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∃vk∀vk+1∃vnF2(vk, vk+1, vn). Now, by induction hypothesis, we have for all c ∈ S2
that A+ |= ϕ∗(c). It follows that
A+ |= ∃vk∀vk+1∃vn(V (vk+1) ∨ (ϕ∗(a¯, vn) ∧ F2(vk, vk+1, vn)))
that is
A+ |= (Q−β vnϕ(a¯, vn))∗.
Conversely, assume now that A is a τ -structure of cardinality |A| = λ, X, Y ⊂
A with |X| ≥ ℵα, |Y | < ℵβ, and Z1, Z2 ternary relations in A such that A+ =
〈A, X, Y, Z1, Z2〉 is a model of Σ∗. We show that A is a model of Σ. We do it by
induction on the formation of formulas, proving that for any formula ϕ ∈ Σ∗
(+) A+ |= ϕ∗ → A |= ϕ.
Again the only interesting case is the generalized quantifier. Let us use henceforth
the notation:
S = {a ∈ A : A |= ϕ(a)},
S∗ = {a ∈ A : A+ |= ϕ(a)∗}.
First suppose A+ |= (Q+αvnϕ(a¯, vn))∗. By (5), it means A+ |= ∃vk∀vk+1∃vn
(U(vk+1)→ (ϕ∗(vn)∧F1(vk, vk+1, vn))), that is, there is a one-to-one function map-
ping X into S∗. By induction hypothesis, S∗ = S, so |S| ≥ |X| ≥ α, whence
A |= Q+αvnϕ(a¯, vn). Similarly for the case A+ |= (Q−β vnϕ(a¯, vn))∗. And this com-
pletes the proof of the theorem. 
Now we consider the case in which β is a limit. Again we follow Shelah’s work on
[Sh71].
Definition 94. A (λ, µ, ν)-like ordered model is a model 〈A,R, P,Q . . . 〉 with |A| =
λ, R binary and P and Q unary, such that |PA| is at least µ, and such that RA is
a ν-like ordering of QA.
Definition 95. Given two ordinals α, β, we say that α is small for β if κα < β for
all κ < β, and the cofinality of β is greater than α.
We have to prove the following
Proposition 96. Let T be a first-order theory in a vocabulary σ, and λ ≥ µ, with
ℵ0 small for ν. If every finite subtheory of T has a (λ, µ, ν)-like ordered model, then
T has a (λ, µ, ν)-like ordered model.
Let λ ≥ µ > ν be infinite cardinals, ν limit, T a first-order theory in a vocabulary
σ of cardinality at most ν, A a set {ai : i < λ} of constants, and consider the
following condition (??) on T :
(??): There is a family {El : l < ν} of equivalence relations on
⋃
n<ω A
n such that
each El has less than ν equivalence classes, and a function h :
⋃
n<ω ρ
n → field(<)
such that such that | field(<)| = ρ ≤ λ ; and the set of all the following sentences
is consistent with T :
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(i) ai 6= aj for i 6= j,
(ii) ai < aj for i < j < ν,
(iii) P (ai), where ν ≤ i < µ,
(iv) Q(ai), where i < ν,
(v) Q(τ(ai1 , . . . , ain))→ τ(ai1 , . . . , ain) < ah(i1,...,in), where τ is a term of σ,
(vi) τ(b¯) = τ(c¯)∨ (al < τ(b¯)∧ al < τ(c¯)), where, for some n, τ is an n-place term
of σ, b¯, c¯ ∈ An, and τ(b¯)Elτ(c¯),
(vii) < is a linear order of Q.
Lemma 97. Let λ > µ > ν be infinite cardinals, ν a limit, and T a first order
theory with |T | ≤ ν. Suppose T has names for Skolem functions and satisfies (??).
Then T has a (λ, µ, ν)-like ordered model.
Proof. We can consider the vocabulary σ of T , to be of cardinality ≤ ν. By
(∗∗), there is a model M in the language σ′ = σ ∪ {A,<′} that satisfies (i) − (vi)
above. By LS, we can assume M to be of cardinality λ. To simplify notation, we
can identify each ai with the element of M that is denoted by it, and thus we have
A ⊂M .
Let N be the elementary submodel of M, such that N is the union of A and
the set of elements of the form τMσ(b1, . . . , bn), where b1, · · ·n ∈ A. Since there
are λ finite strings b1, · · ·n in A, and there are at most ν (M  σ)-terms, there are
λ + λ ∗ ν = λ elements in N . Since in A we already have at least µ elements in
P , we are certain |PN| ≥ µ. Now we have to show that QN is ν-like ordered by
<. Condition (vi) says that for each al in Q, there is an equivalence relation El
(with less than ν-many equivalence classes) such that the interpretation of each new
term (there are ν-many) over the tuples of the same equivalence class is the same,
or otherwise every different image is bigger than al, which makes al have less than
ν-many predecessors. Then, (QN, <N) is a ν-like order, and N  σ is a (λ, µ, ν)-like
ordered model. 
Lemma 98. Let λ ≥ µ > ν be infinite cardinals and ν a limit with ℵ0 small for
ν. Let T be a first order theory in a vocabulary σ, with |T | ≤ ℵ0. If T has a
(λ, µ, ν)-like ordered model, then T satisfies (??).
Proof. LetM be a (λ, µ, ν)-like ordered model of T . Expand the vocabulary ofM
with the set of new constants A, and interpret each ai so that they are the names of
all the elements ofM , and so that ai, i < ν are the names of all the elements of QM,
and ai, ν < i < µ are the names of the elements of PM. Let M′ be the expansion
of M such that M ′ = M = A,QM′ = {ai : i < ν} and PM′ = {ai : ν < i < µ}. Set
M′′ =M′  (σ∪A). It is obvious thatM′′ is a model of T and that (i)-(iv) hold in it.
Then we can define a function h so that in condition (v), τ(ai1 , . . . , ain) < ah(i1,...,in),
if τ(ai1 , . . . , ain) is in the domain of <.
Now define a set {El : l < ν} of equivalence relations such that for any pair
of n-tuples a¯, b¯ of A, and for some l, a¯Eb¯ if, for every n-place M′′-term τ , either
τ(a¯) = τ(b¯) or al < τ(a¯) ∧ al < τ(b¯). It is clear that (vi) holds, and it remains
to show that each El has less than ν-many equivalence classes. Let Trmn be the
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set of all n-terms of σ. For each a¯ ∈ An, let fa¯ be the function from Trmn to
{ai : i < ν} ∪ {e} (where e is a new individual constant) defined as:
fa¯(τ) =
{
ai if τ(ai) ≤ al, l < ν
e otherwise
}
There are at most ℵ0 terms, so there are at most κℵ0 < ν equivalence classes, for
some κ < ν. 
Lemma 99. If ν = νℵ0, T is an at most countable first-order theory, and every
finite subtheory of T satisfies (??), so does T .
Proof. This proof is like the proof of lemma 93. 
Lemma 100. T satisfies (??) iff every countable subtheory of T satisfies (??).
Proof. Again this proof is as in Shelah’s [Sh71], only modifying that the permuta-
tions on the relation symbols keep fixed P and <. 
All the above lemmas prove Proposition 96.
We now adapt Fuhrken translation to this case, because we cannot chose for V
a cardinality κ < ℵβ such that being less than ℵβ implies being less or equal to κ.
Instead, we choose an ℵβ- like ordering P in A (an ordering in which every initial
segment is of size less than ℵβ), and for every definable subsetX with complement of
cardinality < ℵβ in A, we choose a one-to-one function that maps the complement
of an initial segment of P into X.
Let τ be a vocabulary, and U, V, P, F1, F2 be respectively two unary, one binary
and two ternary predicates not in τ . Let L∗ωω = Lωω[τ ∪ {U, V, P, F1, F2}]. For any
formula φ ∈ Lωω[τ ](Q+α , Q−β ), let φ∗ be:
(1) ϕ∗ = ϕ if ϕ is atomic.
(2) (¬ϕ)∗ = ¬ϕ∗ if ϕ ∈ Lωω[τ ]
(3) (ϕ ∧ ψ)∗ = ϕ∗ ∧ ψ∗
(4) (∃xϕ(x))∗ = ∃xϕ∗(x)
(5) (Q+αvnϕ(vn))∗ = ∃vk∀vk+1∃vn(U(vk+1)→ (ϕ(vn)∗ ∧ F1(vk, vk+1, vn)))
(6) (Q−β vnϕ(vn))
∗ = ∃vk∀vk+1∃vn(P (vk+1, vk+2) ∨ (ϕ(vn)∗ ∧ F2(vk, vk+1, vn))).
We associate with any set Σ ⊆ Lωω(Q+α , Q−β )[τ ] a set Σ∗ ⊆ L∗ωω which consists of
the following sentences:
(a) All the sentences σ∗, for σ ∈ Σ
(b) The sentence which says “F1, F2 are indexed collections of one-to-one func-
tions”.
(c) The sentences which says that P totally orders V .
Lemma 101. A relational structure A of cardinality λ is a model of Σ iff there
are two subsets X, Y of A, |X| ≥ ℵα a binary relation W on Y which is a ℵβ-like
ordering, and two ternary relations Z1, Z2 on A such that A+ = 〈A, X, Y,W,Z1, Z2〉
is a model of Σ∗.
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Proof. We only prove the part concerning the quantifier Q−β . Suppose first that
A is a model of Σ. Let Y be a subset of A, and W an ℵβ-like ordering of Y . Let
A be the set of all subsets S of A such that for some n, a¯ ∈ An, and subformula
Q−β vnφ(a¯, vn) of a sentence of Σ true in A,
S = {a ∈ A : A |= φ(a¯, a)}
For every S ∈ A, let h be a one-to-one function that maps the complement of
an initial segment of W into elements of S. Since there are as many functions h as
definable subsets in A, we can index these functions by elements of A.
Let Z1 be a ternary relation defined on A by:
< x, y, z >∈ Z2 iff for some h ∈ H, f(h) = x and h(y) = z.
Clearly A+ is a model of (a)− (c) above. We have to prove that it is a model of
the sentences σ∗ for σ ∈ Σ. We prove by induction on the formation of formulas
that
(?) A |= φ→ A+ |= φ∗
Suppose A |= Q−β vnφ(a¯, vn). Let S = {a ∈ A : A |= φ(a¯, a)}. Then, |S| <
ℵβ, and there is a one-to-one function h mapping the complement of an initial
segment of W into S. Therefore (A+, S) |= ∃vk∃vk+2∀vk+1∃vn(P (vk+1, vk+2) ∨
(S(vn) ∧ F2(vk, vk+1, vn))). Now, by induction hypothesis, we have that for all
a ∈ S,A+ |= φ∗(a¯, a). It follows that A+ |= ∃vk∃vk+2∀vk+1∃vn(P (vk+1, vk+2) ∨
(φ∗(a¯, vn) ∧ F2(vk, vk+1, vn))). That is
A+ |= (Q−β vnφ(a¯, a))∗.

Theorem 102. Lωω(Q+α , Q−β ) is compact, if α < β, or if β ≤ α and ℵ0 is small for
ℵβ.
Proof. Cases α < β and β < α follow from Propositions 87 and 92, and Lemmas 93
and 101. The case β = α has negation and thus is Shelah’s result in [Sh71]. 
Compactness of logics obtained by adding various quantifiers Q+α and Q
−
β to first
order logic reduces to the above analysis if all the relevant cardinals ℵβ are below
all the relevant cardinals ℵα, or vice versa, but the general case seem quite difficult
to tackle.
6.3. Separation.
Separation theorem in logics Lωω(Q+α , Q−β ) depends on the relation between α
and β. Only when β > α does separation hold for L = Lωω(Q+α , Q−β ). Since by the
results of last section this logic is also compact, we get that without negation, there
are compact extensions of first-order logic that satisfy separation.
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Theorem 103. If L = Lωω(Q+α , Q−β ), and α ≥ β, then L does not satisfy the
interpolation theorem.
Proof. Let R be an equivalence relation, and let
K1 = {(A,R) : R has at least ℵα classes.}
and
K2 = {(A,R) : R has less than ℵβ classes.}
K1 andK2 are PC-classes in L. Indeed letKi =Mod(φi)  R, and the vocabulary
of φi be {R,P}, where P is a unary predicate. Let φ1 = the conjunction of
(1) R is an equivalence relation;
(2) “There are at least ℵα elements in P ”, that is, Q+αxP (x);
(3) “P is a set of non-equivalent elements.” That is
∀x∀y((P (x) ∧ P (y))→ ¬R(x, y))
.
Now let φ2 be the conjunction of
(1) R is an equivalence relation;
(2) “There are less than ℵβ elements in ¬P ”, that is, Q−β P (x);
(3) “¬P meets every equivalence class.” That is, ∀x∃y(¬P (y) ∧R(x, y))
Then, clearly K1 and K2 are as we wanted, and are disjoint. The proof is com-
pleted by the following theorem of Caicedo
Theorem 104 (Caicedo [Ca79]). Let L∞ω(Mon) denotes L∞ω with any finite num-
ber of monadic quantifiers. Let (κ, µ) be a model for an equivalence relation R, with
cardinality κ and µ many equivalence classes.
Then (κ, µ1) ≡L∞ω(Mon) (κ, µ2) whenever κ ≥ µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ ω. 
A weaker version of the above theorem was proved by Väänänen in [V74].
Theorem 105. If L = Lωω(Q+α , Q−β ), and α < β, then L satisfies the separation
theorem.
Proof. Let φ˜ be the sentence that results from φ ∈ L when we replace Q+α every-
where by Q+0 .
Let ϕ ∈ L[τ1] and ψ ∈ L[τ2], with τi ⊃ τ for i = 1, 2 such that Mod(ϕ) 
τ ∩Mod(ψ)  τ = ∅.
We show Mod(ϕ˜)  τ ∩ Mod(ψ˜)  τ = ∅. Let τ ′′ be a disjoint copy of τ ′ =
(τ1∩ τ2)\ τ , and ρ : τ ′ → τ ′′ be a renaming. Suppose the claim does not hold. Then
there is a model M of ϕ˜ ∧ ψ˜ρ, where the possible common symbols in (τ1 ∩ τ2) \ τ
has been renamed in ψ˜ in order to avoid conflict. Add to τ a set C = {ci : i ∈ ℵα}
of ℵα many constants, and let T = Th(M). Now consider the set of sentences
S = {ξj(ci) : i ∈ ℵα, j such that ξ is a subformula of ϕ or ψρ and ξMj is infinite}.
Then by compactness S ∪ T has a model N of size ℵα, which is a model of ϕ ∧ ψρ.
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Hence, the restriction of N to τ is in Mod(ϕ)  τ as well as in Mod(ψρ)  τ , which
is the same as Mod(ψ)  τ , since the renaming only affects symbols outside τ . That
makes Mod(ϕ)  τ ∩Mod(ψ)  τ nonempty, a contradiction.
Now we show that there is a first order sentence that separates Mod(ϕ˜)  τ
and Mod(ψ˜)  τ -and hence Mod(ϕ)  τ and Mod(ψ)  τ . Suppose that no
such sentence exists. Adding extra predicates to code partial isomorphisms, and
using compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem properties of Lωω(Q+0 ) (as is done in,
for example, [Fl85]), we get two countable models A and B such that A |= ϕ˜ and
B |= ψ˜, and there is a sequence of length ω of partial isomorphisms between A
and B. Since partially isomorphic countable models are isomorphic, and Mod(ϕ˜) is
closed under isomorphisms, A |= ϕ˜ implies B |= ϕ˜, but thenB ∈Mod(ϕ˜)∩Mod(ψ˜)
-a contradiction. 
In the case we have several cardinal quantifiers, L = Lωω(Q+αj , Q−βk), for j =
0, . . . ,m and k = m+ 1, . . . , n, has separation only if every βk is bigger than every
αj, in which case we should argue as in Theorem 105. Otherwise, Theorem 103
applies.
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